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
THE EFFECT OF US NATIONAL INTERESTS ON ARMS TRANSFER
DECISION MAKING IN BRAZIL(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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
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THESIS

THE EFFECT OF U.S. NATIONAL
INTERESTS ON ARMS TRANSFER
DECISION MAKING IN BRAZIL

by

Jane Dalla Mura

September 1983

Thesis Advisor:

Dr. Frank Teti

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The Effect of U.S. National
Interests on Arms Transfer
Decision Making in Brazil

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., Montclair State College, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the effect of United States national interests on foreign policy toward Latin America. Specifically, it concerns the decisions to transfer or deny arms to Brazil and the influence the human rights policy had on those decisions. Various theories on the concept of the national interest are provided, as are citations of both U.S. and Latin American policy makers on their respective countries' interests. Conditions conducive to arms transfer are described for both the United States as supplier and Latin America/ Brazil as recipients. The status of Brazil's own arms industry is described to exemplify its self-determination as affected by the desire to break away from what they perceive to be a paternalistic United States. The thesis concludes that the arms transfer relationship between Brazil and the United States is significantly influenced by U.S. national interests.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The hypothesis of this paper is that U.S. national interests affect arms transfer decision making in selected Latin America, specifically Brazil. As with any hypothesis, before the author's thoughts are presented, a reader might invoke certain assumptions. Following is a summary of possible assumptions or variations on the hypothesis, and a discussion of those dimensions so that the reader will know what considerations went into the author's approach to the issue.

The hypothesis may best be analyzed by breaking down the statement. The essential elements are: (1) The U.S. national interests; (2) arms transfer decision-making; (3) Latin America (Brazil). A description of methodology applied in proving the hypothesis will follow the discussion of those components. Limitations of the thesis, although not specifically stated, will be implied in that latter section of the introduction.

A. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS

Most simply, the qualification "U.S." will eliminate any in-depth treatment of the national interests of any other country in arms transfer dealings with Latin America. The other actors who have national interests in Latin American arms transfer include the following suppliers: France, West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Israel, and the Soviet Union.

The national interests of the recipient will not be enumerated as such. Rather they will appear in those cases where they coincide or are opposed to those of the United States.

The term "national interests" is a debatable one. ¹ A definition applicable to this subject will be given after acknowledging the many ways in which the term can be interpreted. These interpretations will consider the extremes of moralism and realism, and the influence of public opinion and political elites on that which is baptized "the national interests." Ultimately, no absolute national interests can be named that will perpetually affect arms transfers. There are two reasons for this position: (1) interests by themselves are a fluid, "moody" concept. (2) When modified by the word "national," it invites the perceptions of the entire population of the country at worst, and those of pluralities of individual actors, bureaucratic organizations, and the public, at best.

A further complication arises when the distinction between being in the national interest and being a national interest is made. Making such a distinction is the luxury of the one observing the decision maker and the publicity around or implementation of the decision. The subject of arms transfers involves many combinations of interests and policies enacted to encourage or to restrain them. Arms transfers have been used as a device to further still another policy in the national interest, that of human rights. When two policies are so linked, events may prove that one overrides the other. It does not necessarily mean unequivocally that one is a greater national interest or

¹Participants in the "debate" cover the subject from a wide range of standpoints: some insist the national interests underlie all action (Morgenthau); others feel that the world is too large, and political inquiry is becoming too systematic to rely on the concept (Rosenau).

that they should not have been so conjoined. At the time of the making of a decision, be it the pronouncement of a policy or of a program, the action to be exercised under its auspices will be considered to be in the national interest. Results due to the "marketing" of the policy may prove otherwise, e.g., the way President Carter failed to "sell" human rights. Lessons learned may or may not serve to alter subsequent determinants of the national interest.

Such considerations provide insight to an otherwise simple substantive statement. They help make the transition between the complexities of defining the national interests concerning a policy in a geographical area and the pronouncements about a decision based on those interests.

B. ARMS TRANSFER DECISION MAKING

This section discusses the difficulties in measuring arms transfers, offering a solution through treating the question of the decision whether to transfer or deny arms, rather than the measure of the level of arms itself.

1. Difficulties in Measuring Effects of Interests on Transfers

Consider using the level of arms transfer from the U.S. to a recipient Latin American country as a measure. For example, it is in the U.S. national interest to have sold the F-16 to Venezuela for several reasons: (1) it is our ally in the Rio Pact; (2) the tension in the Caribbean recommends it both for the defense of democracy and for the protection of military and sea lanes; (3) it is rich in strategic resources. The act of transfer would be proven or disproven to have occurred as a result of it being in the national interest. This proved to be an infeasible method for these general reasons: conflicting national interests

and inability to draw a cause and effect relationship even between quantifiable variables.

a. Conflicting National Interests

It would be foolish to hypothesize that the decision to sell or deny arms is done without consideration of the national interests. The problem is that arms transfers may be in the national interest for reasons such as those enumerated for Venezuela, but against the national interest of human rights, if it were found to be the case that they were violated or falsely reported there. Furthermore, it might be found, for example, that the level of arms transfers in Venezuela would prove higher than that for Brazil. This might lead to the conclusion that it is less in our national interest to transfer arms to Brazil than it is to Venezuela. Jumping to this conclusion completely ignores any other variables such as a decision on the part of the recipient to transfer arms with other countries besides the U.S. Another consideration is that other circumstances in the recipient, not related to arms transfers, may be just as much in the national interest. The prime example is how the economic situation in Brazil could endanger its political stability.

b. Lack of Causal Relationship

Looking to other "measurables", it was thought that data from World Military Expenditures on Arms Transfers might show more concrete relationships. Therefore, a multiple regression of such independent variables as military expenditures, gross national product, central government expenditures, population, armed forces, and total imports was done on the dependent variable of arms transfers. Although some positive correlations were found, none were significant, and the data is not included because of

its lack of relevance. These findings were not unlike those of professionals, among whom are Geoffrey Kemp, who found that empirical studies offer conflicting conclusions and seldom establish causal relationships [Ref. 1: p. 41]. Even a semi-static factor of arms on hand is difficult to quantify. And arms transfers, being an active, two-way process, are all the harder to pin down, even if a sole supplier and sole recipient are named. Specific difficulties encountered include these questions: When are arms considered officially transferred? How does one count arms, some of whose parts are from elsewhere, that are assembled in country? What happens when the national interests dictate that arms be restrained? [Ref. 2: pp. 89-90]

Such frustrations with the countable caution a researcher that to try to measure a quality such as the national interests is plainly impossible. ²

Finally, the question of the effects of arms transfers is complicated by ideological predispositions and value preferences of policy makers and academicians alike [Ref. 1: p. 38].

On the issue of declining arms transfers to Latin America, the differing philosophies of three recent presidents exemplify this. In brief, the Nixon Doctrine sought to diminish military presence and have American arms represent us abroad. Carter felt that arms should not be a "reward" for repressive regimes. Reagan feels that instability might be remedied by arms sales. To underline the variety of predispositions, within Reagan's very administration, there are officials who are wary of arms accumulated by potential adversaries courtesy of the U.S. [Ref. 3: p. 53].

²Nevertheless, there have been attempts to determine correlations between human rights violations and military assistance. This study will be mentioned in the body of the thesis.

Because all these problems tend to confuse the issue, a "combination" methodology, which will be described later, was created in order to prove the hypothesis.

2. The Decision Making Aspect of Arms Transfers

The originally stated hypothesis, that national interests affect arms transfers decision making, is perhaps better phrased by rewording it as follows: the abstract concept of national interests is connected to the nearly measurable one of arms transfers by the procedure of decision making. The term "decision making" itself embodies the thought and deliberation akin to the abstraction, as well as the act of deciding. If a decision is carried out, it will provide a semblance of tangible results. Stating that part of the hypothesis in such a way allows the flexibility to treat how interests affect arms transfers without restricting the discussion to a direct cause and effect relationship.

a. The Terms "Policy" and "Program"

Another point to be kept in mind is the use of terms regarding the results of decision making. Although they are assumed in Congress and elsewhere in simple dictionary defined meanings, words such as "policy" and "program" are victimized by the same phenomenon as the phrase "national interests." No one is certain of the nuances of a person's or group's interpretation of the concept. Also, it has frequently been said that we have no Latin American policy. What qualities might be missing from existing treatments of Latin American problems, by whatever name? Is a policy or program supposed to be universally applicable to the region? What is the time limit for applicability? How strictly is it supposed to apply?

b. The Term "Latin America"

A similar lack of consensus on terminology exists for the name of the area itself. What is "Latin America? Why is that nineteenth century French term still used? How much uniformity is assumed by using one term for every bit of land in the Western Hemisphere whose ancestors' languages had roots in Latin?

In this case, the name is merely a label, and the topic area is easily understood by context. As long as those concerned are aware that the term "Latin America" is still used broadly to include all those countries mentioned above, there should be little confusion or insult. What can be imminently dangerous are preconceptions of Latin America and its very different countries as being analogous to the commonality of the United States of America. The use of foreign languages rooted in Latin does not allow for the size and resources of each nation, the dynamics of ethnic mixes, the exquisite diversities of culture.

C. LATIN AMERICA/ BRAZIL

The third component of the hypothesis is stated as above because is used with this rationale: some U.S. national interests apply to the whole of Latin America, yet to force a strict focused comparison of all threats and conditions of Latin American countries pertinent to arms transfers would be laborious and often repetitive. Some threats are not that interesting or serious; some conditions are not so distinctive. The effort would be greater than the actual significance of arms transfers in a global context. To properly place the subject in the international arena, the variables are dealt with by citing:

(1) in selected cases those U.S. interests in Latin American countries which stand out from the others;

(2) particular threats, e.g., border conflicts that exist only in certain Latin American countries, because they naturally motivate the need for arms;

(3) general political and economic conditions as they engender U.S. national security interests.

The reason Brazil was chosen as the case country cover economic, political, and military rationales. That is, in spite of debt and global recession, Brazil is one of the strongest economies in Latin America; it is presently exempting itself once again from the extremes of military dictatorship and moving toward a more mature, "guided" democracy that promises to endure; finally, it is one of the few Latin American countries having its own arms industry, thus sharing another kind of commonality with the supplier country whose interests will be examined for effect in arms transfer decision making.

The interdependence to be made evident in the chapters on conditions in the recipient and supplier countries will serve to prove that national interests do indeed affect U.S. arms transfers decision making.

D. METHODOLOGY

As has been mentioned, the methodology to be used is a modified focused comparison. That is, although similar issues will be dealt with regarding both U.S. and Latin American national interests, not as much attention will be given to the history of the national interests of Latin America. Also, the problem of conflicting national interests will be restricted to the major ones in the U.S. To introduce a list of conflicting interests in the recipient would complicate the thesis unnecessarily. Thus, the generalized Latin American national interest of self-determination will prevail. The general U.S. interests in Latin America will be

cited in the description of chapter three. That chapter also provides an idea of other Latin American national interests, as voiced in the Declaration of Ayacucho, a late 1970's declaration by eight Latin American countries often cited in discussions of possible regional arms restraint.

Whenever possible, graphic presentation will be offered to clarify concepts or support statements.

1. The Problem of the National Interests

Chapter two provides background on the term "national interests," its use, its importance, and philosophical variations on the concept itself. Basically it deals with the non-definable, undeterminable process of acting in the national interest, concluding that all the dynamics of the process must be considered before labelling a policy as "in the national interest" and expecting predictable, favorable results.

2. Policymaker Thinking on U.S./Latin American Interests

Chapter three names the national interests as declared historically and recently in Latin American and arms transfer policy statements. Specific national interests that will be touched upon directly or indirectly in that chapter include: political stability, economic stability, the balance of power, anti-communism, anti-terrorism, counterinsurgency, free trade, human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, democratization, Caribbean sea lanes, natural and strategic resources.

3. Conditions in the Recipient

Chapter four describes the conditions in certain recipient Latin American countries wherein U.S. arms transfer or denial would be advisable in light of those

conditions. No specific recommendations are made in that respect; the chapter merely attempts to answer the following economic and politico-military questions which might help in making the decision:

What economic interests in Latin America/Brazil are of concern to the U.S.? How did the current situation come about? What can be done to remedy the Latin American economic situation to benefit both parties and possibly the world economy? Can economic benefits result from arms trade? Does the case country of Brazil exemplify these benefits?

What is the political situation in Latin America? How do political circumstances influence arms sales? How do Latin American arms purchases compare with the rest of the world? What are the implications of Latin American arms purchase patterns in terms of possible regional restraint? What political factors in Brazil have a bearing on their arms industry and its future?

What is the magnitude of armed forces in Latin America? To what extent are arms purchased indigenously there? How great is the capacity to absorb sophisticated arms obtained outside of Latin America? What are incentives for arms purchase?

4. U.S. Rationales as Supplier

Chapter five uses general rationales for the United States to supply arms and elaborate on those pertinent to conditions in Latin America, particularly in Brazil. The rationales will be divided into the political, military, and economic benefits and cost rationales offered by Geoffrey Kemp and Steven Miller in their work "The Arms Transfer Phenomenon." [Ref. 4: p. 24] These in turn will cover the

topics of influence and leverage, support for allies and need to protect base and intelligence-collecting rights, and will repeat some of the economic issues addressed in chapter four. The discussion of costs will deal with reverse leverage, the promotion of arms races, and identification with repressive regimes.

A comparison of trends in Foreign Military Sales, the Military Assistance Program, and Commercial sales from the United States is made over the period 1966 through 1982, to attempt to see the effect U.S. policy, particularly under the Carter Administration, had on those arms related matters in Brazil.

5. Arms in Brazil

Chapter six provides a summary of the current status of the arms industry in Brazil after a short review of U.S. relations that contributed to its rise.

II. THE PROBLEM OF THE NATIONAL INTERESTS

The national interest is indeed a concept, and, as such, it is boundless. At its most definable it is an "abstract generic idea generalized from particular instances." The best "definitions" of it are those which allow for "particular instances." Unfortunately, these are highly criticable, much like those aberrations which Hans Morgenthau lamented try to touch everything "and come to grips with nothing." [Ref. 10: p. 833] Thus, they cease to be true definitions.

The only recourse for one who wishes to find meaning in the concept is to familiarize himself with all its dimensions. Also, it is worthwhile to work with existing or proposed definitions. Two attempts will be discussed here, and the facets of more lengthy treatments of the concept will be developed. These might be grouped into two major categories of philosophical and practical questions.

Philosophical questions include:

- Is the concept idealistically or materialistically based?
- Are the national interests subjective or objective?
- Do moral considerations in determining national interests adversely affect policy?

An intermediate, half philosophical, half practical question is: What do results of actions based on the national interests have to do with the national interests themselves? ³

³Richard L. Millett, a history professor from the University of Illinois present at the House hearing on Arms Transfer policy in Latin America, when asked whether Reagan's more liberal transfer policy would advance interests in Latin America, said that it was questionable to what extent any official policy on arms transfers could actually influence contemporary developments, but he raised that

Practical questions are:

- What is the term used for; why does the term exist?
- What does it mean to defend something in terms of the national interests; i.e., what is being defended?

Those questions are expanded upon by providing some background through a sampling of certain authors' treatments of both kinds of questions. Some one-sentence attempts at definitions will be examined, and as will ideas of what it is that we wish to defend in terms of various interpretations of the national interest.

A. BACKGROUND

It is interesting to note that in less modern times, national interests were referred to as "national honor," "public interest," and "general will." Those original terms for the emerging concept were ironically close to what is expressed in the simplified idea that "the national interest is what the nation, i.e., the decision-maker, decides it is." [Ref. 5: p. 36] Such names for the concept as "the will of the prince" and "dynastic interests" [Ref. 6: p. 34] seemed to reflect greater accuracy as to whose interests were considered in decision making. Regardless of support of the people and belief in royal powers, policy was subjective, and so terms for the "national" interests were named.

question in the context of emphasizing that economic policy would have a much greater effect. In so doing, Millett exemplifies a concept to be introduced in this chapter, that of seeing the national interests as an output of decision making: "If the U.S. does x, its interests won't be endangered; they will be enhanced." It is more accurate to treat them as an input: "This action is in our interest, enacting policy x will enhance the national interest."

Schools of thought arose according to whether or not national interests were subjective or objective. Believers in the national interest as subjective preferences that change along with the aspirations of a nation's members are appropriately known as subjectivists. Objectivists, on the other hand, hold that interest should be based on a describable objective reality such as power.

Whether the motivator is goals for the future, or the seeming "objective reality" of power, it is difficult to escape that national interests are intimately related to values and ideals.

Hans Morgenthau labored extensively to bring the concept down to earth by following the philosophy that "the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated." This recognition of "political and cultural context" is the strongest quality of Morgenthau's work, for he goes on to essentially ignore that values and ideals do play a significant role in the background of the political and cultural context. Shirking from moral abstractions, Morgenthau accused moralism of divorcing thought from action. He preferred to cling to the more macho abstraction of power, a somewhat observable premium, as a viable determinant of interests.

Abstaining from or fighting for power, or taking sides with abstainers or fighters, help to explain action more concretely than could moralistic terms: power has had history to back it up. Morgenthau held that the moralist openly used moral principles, not national interests, as a guide for action. As an example: he offers Woodrow Wilson, who was lucky that "the objective force of national interests, which no rational man could escape...imposed upon him as the object of his moral indignation the source of America's mortal danger." So Wilson was "redeemed" in that

his moral objective to destroy the Kaiser also happened to be in U.S. political interests.

But the issue should not be whether power struggles or moral abstractions determine the national interests. Nor is it proclaiming the better way to determine interests for the country. For it is true that power struggles are a reality in international affairs whether, through the American historical accident, we have been exempt from them or not. Even moralists who do not operate under the power code are capable of acting in the national interest. Moreover, many nations talk their brand of opinion on non-interference and anti-imperialism, be it morally or power based. Infinite quotes can be cited exemplifying all combinations of contradictions in thought, speech, actions and results. These will be provided in a later chapter.

B. DEFINITIONS

1. Held's Public Interest

Virginia Held is one author who produced a loose definition after a much more worthwhile lead-in to it in her book, The Public Interest and Individual Interests. It reads as follows: "X is in the interest of I (means that) a claim by or in behalf of I for X is asserted as justifiable." Having cited various academics' definitions of "interest" and "individual interest," Held elaborated on three theories:

- (1) preponderance: The action is in the public interest if the majority of individual interests support this action.
- (2) common interest: An action is in the public interest only if it is common to the individual interests of each one.
- (3) unitary conceptions: there is a unitary coherent system of values against which individual and public interests are compared.

Held's work is one of the most thorough and methodical discussions on determining the role of the public in the national interest. Since the public is the largest plurality among all those who would be considered to have a voice in the national interest, her task was monumental. The only shortcoming in her work, outside of the over-generality of the compact definition, is one that cannot be overcome: there is no way to conjecture the interests of those in the public who are without a spokesman [Ref. 6: p. 36].

2. Teti's Procedural Outputs

A more workable hypothesis was composed by Dr. Frank Teti for his students in a seminar on the national interests at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. It proposes that "the national interests are the outputs of a policy-making procedure that satisfy national needs as defined by the problematic context, in a legitimate manner that will result in domestic compliance." In its way, this single sentence encapsulates much of the accomplishments of volumes of "talking around" the subject of the national interests. Its components name concepts that do create an idea of what national interests are in terms of what they do (satisfy national needs), how they do it (through a policy-making procedure), and what should happen when it is done. (It should result in domestic compliance.) This last element imposes a kind of "check" on a decision to verify if it is in fact a national interest. But since a foreign policy decision can be popular at the time of formulation and later yield results averse to domestic compliance, this part of the definition presents a problem.

a. Utility of the Definition

The workability of the statement consists in the following: if national interests are to be defined, national needs must be determined; the statement's term "problematic context" allows for perceptions of those who will enumerate the needs in a situation. It must not be specified who these "enumerators of needs" are; their identity should remain an unstated, independent variable whose correlation with national interests will fluctuate depending on the strength of the other "enumerator" variables working with it on the problem. For purposes of this thesis, however, those who would determine needs range from the television-watching public, to the bureaucratic organizations, on up to the executive branch of the government.

The national interests depend on who is conceiving of them in terms of a particular problematic context and upon which of those mentioned pulls the most weight in that context.

b. Objection

A major objection to the definition is that, as an "output," it is a product of something else. It would better be seen (although thus, less easily defined) as that which justifies the procedures and the decisions made, i.e., as an input. After a bit more discussion, model definitions will be offered. *

*In an encyclopedic entry on the subject, James Rosenau can be cited to support the above objection. He submits that the term "national interest" is useful in political analysis to "describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy." In political action, "it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies." The fact of the concept of national interest being rooted in values makes it easier for actors to use as a way of thinking about their goals and of mobilizing support for them. Even today the goal-related use of national interests is still common. [Ref. 6: p. 34]

As the world grows, U.S. decision-making toward a political action takes agonizingly longer. More

Having considered the above comments on the element of "output", Professor Teti's definition might be modified thus: "The national interests are inputs to a policy-making procedure that satisfy national needs as defined by the problematic context, in a legitimate manner that may or may not result in domestic compliance."

The concept must allow for the influence of changing decision-makers and their moral or power-political inclinations, or combinations thereof. The element of domestic compliance presents a double problem of the definition of "domestic" and of what, or how long "compliance" is supposed to apply. However, with the national interests as an input to decision-making, compliance about considering the interest is not as difficult to achieve. After the passage of time, results of the decision based on the particular interest may change from compliance to non-compliance or vice versa. This is not an insurmountable problem as long as it is kept in mind that with national interests considered as an input, it implies a futurity and uncertainty as to the compliance part of the definition. Results will not always be as wished, or interpreted as such. This is the case in the already cited example of conflict over Reagan's belief that it is in the national interest to transfer arms to foster political stability. The results of such a policy may, now or in the future, easily be argued to have done exactly the opposite.

information is increasingly available, more intellectual viewpoints are considered, as are those of the public, enlightened or otherwise. In this process there is all the greater opportunity for contradiction and confusion. All exposed for the world's perusal, apparently it never occurs to Americans that it may be in our national interests to try to see ourselves as do those with whom we are interacting. Instead we insist that all will believe our morally based motives as we do, regardless of whether they curtail or encourage whatever U.S. involvement objectionable to the nation concerned.

C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Whether something is a national interest or is in the national interest is similar to the argument of whether a person loves someone or is in love with another. For example, it is a U.S. national interest that human rights be practiced universally. It may be so for our "selfish" interests of comfortable political and economic stability that arise more readily out of non-repressive regimes, but it is a U.S. national interest nonetheless. On the other hand, human rights has not proven to be in the U.S. national interest because it has resulted in other than the desired or even expected results of accused nations seeing the light and then behaving properly so as to "merit" U.S. attention, be it in the form of military or economic assistance.

The withholding of arms from Latin American human rights violators brought outcomes that would have been naive not to expect. Not the least of those results included unilateral cutting off of military assistance programs on the part of Brazil, the tremendous expansion of its own arms industry, and the diversification of arms suppliers by other Latin American countries. These results may be seen as non-detrimental. But in the argument of whether an action is in the national interest or a national interest per se, results make the difference. For if a policy action is in the national interest, the national interest is an output. That is, the result is in the national interest. Whereas if a policy action and a national interest are one and the same, the result will be due to the national interest as an input to the process of decision making. For example, human rights and arms transfers can be considered both national interests and policies. If the two had been treated separately by the Carter administration, and the decision on policy had been different, the effect on our relations with recipient country Brazil might not have suffered as badly.

Below is an attempt at a graphic depiction of the options in dealing with national interests:

<u>National Interest</u>	<u>Policy</u>	<u>Result</u>
human rights	arms denial	damaged relations improvement of h.r. practices
human rights	other than punitive policy	better relations improvement in h.r. practices
political stability	arms transfer	compliance or non-compliance

First, there are those that remain abstractions and are treated with a "concrete" but unrelated policy that also happens to be in the national interest. Doing this might not completely hinder the result, but the achievement of the result is more accidental than planned.

Second, an abstract national interest is treated more fluidly and is less likely to have an adverse effect.

Third, a less abstract national interest is treated with a policy that is more directly related to it. Again, the results, as with the Reagan arms transfer policy, are debatable, but the aims are more clearly defined, and analysts may better identify problems if distinctions between the interests, the possible ways to achieve them, and the desired results.

Another question about the approach to the discussion of the national interests arises in an article by Arthur Whitaker on the Western Hemisphere idea. While the term "national interests" does not appear verbatim in the writing, it treats of perception of the often-termed

"special relationship" between the United States and those south of the Rio Grande. This perception was influenced by the moralist, idealist and realist views pointed out by Morgenthau. The author shows that in the course of American history, U.S./Latin American foreign policy was practiced according to moral, ideal, or real inclinations of the power elite. ⁵ [Ref. 7: p. 1] The particular significance in this article is that the author takes care to furnish the reader with a warning that should come to mind whenever there are debates on ideals, values, and national interests. That warning consists in the distinction of an idea from a policy, and a policy from a program.

In treating the problem of human rights in Latin America, and especially concentrating on Brazil, the policy of arms restraint looms as a link. Since both can be considered national interests and policies, several questions can be asked: Which of the two was a national interest? Which was more appropriately in the national interest? Once the ideas would be distinguished from the policy, which of these would be the program? Consider the following: the practice of worldwide anti-torture is a national interest of the U.S., which can be called an idea, a value, a goal, or an ideal; the policy which the U.S. formulated to effect the elimination of torture was the human rights policy; and the program of the policy was to withhold arms transfers to any countries that violated the human rights policy. The idea, the policy, and the program

⁵It may be better said that the United States dealt with the region accordingly, for a "policy" on that very broad area known as Latin America is virtually non-existent except in a fragmented way, and rightly so, considering the diversity of its nations and regions. The U.S. has reacted separately in Latin America due to the U.S. tendency toward crisis management and ad hoc decision making which has led to a non-deliberate recognition of Latin America's distinctions. The U.S. government should diplomatically acknowledge and describe its own behavior and develop a policy wherein it would state a broad Latin American area concept as well as area or country distinctions.

were not respected for distinctions. The practice of human rights was supposed to magically occur with the curtailment of U.S. arms. This did not happen, and, coincidentally, both human rights violations declined, and arms were quite easily obtained elsewhere or produced within the countries towards which arms sales were restrained.

Another association triplet might be added, contributing to the proof of the thesis in light of human rights as a national interest: are we dealing with a national interest/ideal, out of which develops a policy to make that ideal a reality, and which brings results which may not be in the national interest?

Such a practice of policy making based on a national interest as a lofty ideal only accidentally results in the realization of the national interest. For Wilson, it worked. For Carter, it didn't. As above, it is because no allowances were made to distinguish two policies. The aim of the Carter policy was to foster human rights. To have enacted it through another policy, arms transfer, eliminated important deliberations such as an enunciation, understandable to the public, of how human rights via arms denial was considered to be in the national interest.

Logically, human rights policy should result in human rights practice; arms transfer policy should result in the transfer or restraint of arms. This is not to say that the human rights policy was entirely unreasoned. The judgment that arms transfer policy could result in the practice of human rights was attributable to the moral view equivalent to the attitude "be nice to me or you won't get any goodies." Eminently insulted, Latin Americans spent their pennies elsewhere. Damaged relations due to this evangelical paternalism were grievous at the time, but not irrevocable. Latin American countries are at a level of sophistication high enough to recognize their own future potential to

withhold goods for various reasons, even moral ones. The underlying lesson for the United States in varying foreign policy approaches is to attempt to discern how the policy will be received. Human rights moralism marketed in a less paternalistic fashion may have succeeded.

The preceding digression leads to these conclusions:

- (1) If the modified Teti definition is depicted graphically, it can easily incorporate the advice of Whitaker.
- (2) To the marriage of Whitaker's and Teti's concepts, might be added the use of results of a program as inputs to a refined idea, to initiate a new policy, through a revised program.

Whitaker: idea(1) ---policy---program

Teti: output---procedure---compliance

Modified: ---input---procedure/policy/program---
compliance---

|-----|

III. POLICY MAKER THINKING ON LATIN AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers the realist, idealist, and moralist classifications of foreign or other policy makers and gives examples of those ways of thinking as applied to Latin American policy from the early days of our country to the present. They prove that while it is convenient and human to label a politician into one of those or any other categories, no particular philosophy proves to be more effective in acting in the national interests. While the realist can reap more credit than less pragmatic policy makers when he is proven by history to have been "right", he looks the worst when that is not the case. To the other extreme, the moralist always sounds "right", but his policies are so abstract that results too often appear as accidents, not as easily applicable to his conscious plans. When accidents are not in his favor, he is the most vulnerable to blame. The idealist hints at morality in his policy and often may act in a power-political fashion [Ref. 10: p. 836]. Right or wrong, he will always have good intentions in his favor. This works rhetorically, but not always politically, especially when dealing with cultures who don't recognize U.S. ideals.

B. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA

Before going into specifics, it is of interest to provide one author's outlook on "The Western Hemisphere Idea. Basically, the Western Hemisphere idea holds that "the United States and Latin America are bound together in a special relationship to the exclusion of the political and economic influence of Europe and the rest of the non-American world." [Ref. 7: p. 161] The idea was shared in Latin America, and lasted both there and in the U.S. despite much dissent from the times of the Founding Fathers through the progressive era ending just prior to World War II. Just after the Second World War, however, the idea started to decline.

The separation of the American from the European sphere was stressed by Jefferson which explains why some ideals of commonality prevailed later. Adams, on the other hand, was averse to the idea that there could be such a thing as an American system. If there were one, he felt the United States "constitute the whole of it...there is no community of interests between North and South America," he declared on Independence Day in 1821 [Ref. 7: pp. 164-165].

C. REALISTS

One early realist, personified by Alexander Hamilton, chose "self-preservation as the first duty of a nation" over the moral concepts of treaty obligations, gratitude, and affinity to an ally. He acted as he spoke.

John Adams provides thought to be resurrected years later in one of the first attempts at policy with Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine. Background to the Monroe Doctrine includes this message from President Adams to Congress on May 16, 1797:

"...Although it is very true that we ought not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe, but to keep ourselves always distinct and separate from it...however we may consider ourselves, the maritime and commercial powers of the world will consider the United States of America as forming a weight in that balance of power in Europe, which can never be forgotten or neglected. It would not only be against our interest, but it would be doing wrong to one half of Europe at least, if we should voluntarily throw ourselves into either scale. It is a natural policy for a nation that studies to be neutral, to consult with other nations, engaged in the same studies and pursuits at the same time..." [Ref. 8: p. 301]

The Monroe Doctrine was quoted in its principal passages by both Gantenbein and Bemis. * The latter adds to Adams' address that "The text of the Monroe Doctrine itself has overshadowed the diplomatic communications which were made at the time to Russia and to Great Britain." The communications were similar to the words of the president before his Congress twenty-six years before. A passage called "observations on the Communications recently received from the Minister of Russia," stated that the U.S. government did not want to meddle with European policy in the propagation of its own principles and modifying of its government according to its own judgments.

"It had recognized the established independence of the former Spanish colonies and entered into political and commercial relations with them, 'relations the more important to the interests of the United States, as the whole of those emancipated regions are situated in their own Hemisphere,' and as the most extensive, populous and powerful of the new Nations are in their immediate vicinity; and one of them bordering upon the Territories of this Union." [Ref. 9: p. 65]

*For the definitive study on the Monroe Doctrine see Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine.

1. The Monroe Doctrine

The following excerpts from the Monroe Doctrine encapsulate major ideas: enunciated in an annual message from the president to Congress, December 2, 1823, from paragraph 7, msg of Dec 2, 1823: "...the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers..."

"It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries...in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators...in the wars of the European powers...we have never taken any part...only when our rights are invaded...we make preparation for defense...we owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety..."

Several decades later, Basis explains, "Theodore Roosevelt confused the Latin American policy of the United States by identifying intervention in the Dominican Republic with the Monroe Doctrine, thus making that Doctrine, which had said 'hands off' to Europe, seem to say 'hands on' for the United States." [Ref. 9: p. 157] But the doctrine neither gave to nor withheld from the United States a right or policy of intervention. "But President Roosevelt that because the Monroe Doctrine prohibited European intervention to secure justice, it ought to follow as a logical corollary that it sanctioned intervention by the United States in order to prevent it by Europe."

2. The Roosevelt Corollary

On February 15, 1905, presented the "protocol" to the Senate. With this corollary to the Monroe Doctrine outgrew the policy of the "Big Stick": benevolent United States intervention to prevent non-American intervention.

"An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American States, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the customhouses, and this means what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because, under the Monroe doctrine it can not see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States." [Ref. 9: p. 157]

3. Dollar Diplomacy

Carrying the Roosevelt Corollary toward a more active and less disinterested intervention, notably in Nicaragua, the term "dollar diplomacy", according to Bemis, was a stigma placed on Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox. It was easy to do so since the president frankly avowed that he considered it a most useful function of government to advance and protect the legitimate trade investments of United States citizens in foreign countries. However, Bemis feels "It was not designed to profit private interests. It was intended rather to support the foreign policy of the United States; in the instance of Latin America to support the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine." As far back as those times, Bemis continues, "In

these interventions in Central America and the Caribbean there was also a certain characteristic missionary impulse to help the people themselves...by stabilizing their governments and economies." ⁷ [Ref. 9: p. 161]

The misinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine resulted in fitting accusations of imperialism on the part of the United States, and is a sterling example of how realism is not always in the national interest.

D. IDEALISTS

The idealist was judged by Morgenthau to have achieved the nation's best interest of self-preservation although verbalizing morally about actions in the national interests. Political thought sounded different from self-preserving, power-conscious political action, but they merged in the end when policy was made [Ref. 10: p. 843]. In this paradox was born the American art of acting in self-interest while expounding universal altruism.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his administration attempted to rescue U.S./Latin American relations from imperialist accusations. On February 4, 1936, at "The Trade Agreements Program in our Inter-American Relations," FDR's Assistant Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, discussed "interest in, and appreciation of value of inter-American relationships; there exists a greater realization on the part of the people of the United States of the value to themselves of a sure political and commercial understanding with the other republics of this hemisphere." In preceding decades there had prevailed a mistrust of U.S. objectives, "a justifiable resentment of the high-handed or patronizing attitude of this government, and an equally definite resent-

⁷Also see George Mowry's "Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement" and Pringle's Theodore Roosevelt.

ment of the tariff policy pursued by the United States, which made it impossible for any free flow of goods between their countries and ours." Armed intervention exacerbated this...also general misconception of the Monroe Doctrine, "erroneous interpretation of that doctrine by ... citizens in high official positions." Welles also brought up how in the hundred plus years of declared independence, we had ignored Latin American pride in history and traditions, and resentment of our attempts to dictate what course they should follow and intervene in their domestic concerns.

While not a pontifical, Wilsonian moralist, FDR was known to speak as from the pulpit:

"Peace comes from the spirit and must be grounded in faith. In seeking peace, perhaps we can best begin by proudly affirming the faith of the Americas: the faith in freedom and its fulfillment which has proved a mighty fortress beyond reach of successful attack in half the world.

"That faith arises from a common hope and a common design given us by our fathers in differing form but with a single aim: freedom and security of the individual, which has become the foundation of our peace.

"If...we can give greater freedom and fulfillment to the individual lives of our citizens, the democratic form of representative government will have justified the high hopes of the liberating fathers. Democracy is still the hope of the world. If we in our generation can continue its successful applications in the Americas, it will spread and supersede other methods by which men are governed and which seem to most of us to run counter to our ideals of human liberty and human progress."
[Ref. 8: p. 177]

In that speech, Roosevelt had enunciated the realities of trade interests: "Interwoven with these problems is the further self-evident fact that the welfare and prosperity of each of our nations depend in large part on the benefits derived from commerce among ourselves and with other nations, for our present civilization rests on the basis of an international exchange of commodities." [Ref. 8: p. 174]

Sumner Welles discussed a major contribution of the FDR administration to Latin American policy:

"... Our new policy of the 'good neighbor' has been predicated upon the belief of this Government that there should exist an inter-American political relationship based on a recognition of actual and not theoretical equality between the American republics; on a complete forbearance from interference by any one republic in the domestic concerns of any other; on economic cooperation; and, finally, on the common realization that in the world at large all of the American republics confront the same international problems, and that in their relations with non-American powers, the welfare and security of any one of them cannot be a matter of indifference to the others." [Ref. 8: p. 167]

Welles goes on to enumerate three years of achievement in attaining those objectives, including that "'dollar diplomacy'...is a thing of the past." [Ref. 8: p.168] A Pan American Day Address by Cordell Hull, Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of State, before the governing board of the Pan American Union, at Washington, April 14, 1944 exemplifies our tendency to equate our ideas on freedom with those of the Latin Americans, appearing hypocritical after the statement on endeavoring to recognize "actual and not theoretical equality."

"Inter-American unity was not brought about by force... was not produced by nations with a homogeneous racial origin... does not depend upon the bonds of a common language or a culture based on a common literature or common customs and habits...(I)nternational American unity proves that there are other sources...which offer hope to a world...Our unity comes from a passionate devotion to human liberty and national independence which is so strong that it does not stop with the effort of each people to secure liberty for itself but goes on to respect is no less valid the desire of other peoples to achieve the same liberty in accordance with their own traditions and historic institutions. Although the language of Bolivar and San Martin was different from that of Washington and Jefferson, they were expressing the same purposes and principles, and they led their countrymen along the same paths." [Ref. 8: p. 245]

1. Inter-American Idealism

It is interesting to observe the "co-productions" of rhetoric born out of Inter-American conferences at which leaders from both Americas were present. Running the gamut of philosophies, they demonstrate the southern understanding of what our northern Western hemispheric ears love to hear. They talk of equality:

"...At the Montevideo conference in 1933, the American republics affirmed their belief in certain essential principles upon which cooperation between nations and international order must be based. "...The principle that every nation, large and small, was equal before the law of nations." Every nation had the right to "develop its own institutions, free from intervention by others." [Ref. 8: p. 819]

a. The Rio Pact

The Inter American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, also known as "the Rio Pact", is a straightforward attempt at North and South American alliance:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any state against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of the individual or collective self-defense..." [Ref. 8: p. 822]

b. The Act of Chapultepec

The Act of Chapultepec also declares that "every attack of a State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against all the American States." [Ref. 8 p. 818] It also states that "the new situation in the world

makes more imperative than ever the union and solidarity of the American peoples, for the defense of their rights and the maintenance of international peace..." It urges that they continue to incorporate the principles of proscription of territorial conquest; condemnation of intervention, internal or external, and it introduces the element of the "personality" of the Americas: "The recognition that respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of each American State constitutes the essence of international order sustained by continental solidarity..." [Ref. 8: p. 817]

c. The Declaration of Ayacucho

The Declaration of Ayacucho, a pronouncement at which no U.S. North Americans were present, contains elements of the three philosophies, and is not a foreign policy per se, but an accurate enunciation of Latin American interests.

Since it is in our national interests to look forward to Latin America as a possible area of regional arms restraint, all North American comments on the Declaration of Ayacucho emphasize the arms restraint intentions contained therein. It makes an interesting digression to examine some excerpts and to note that there are only four paragraphs out of twenty-two in the entire declaration that talk of arms. While it is true that this was to be the main thrust of the document, in the minds of its preparers, it is obvious that they had an economic message to record:

"We declare that:

"Our countries achieved their political independence, but their integration into the world economy subsequently gave rise to various forms of dependence, which explain the obstacles to our economic, social, and cultural development.

"There is an urgent need to finish the task of emancipation by shaping our destiny in the economic and social sphere..."

"The historic and essential commitment of the Latin American continent is to unite for the economic and social liberation and scientific and technological advancement of its constituent countries...This unity calls for a common will...based on solidarity and on recognition of its pluralism..."

The emphasis on pluralism while endeavoring to maintain unity and solidarity punctuate an American identity similar to that of the U.S. The segment below is reminiscent of our "melting pot":

"Latin American nationalism represents the awakening of our peoples to the depth of their being and to their true personality, which is the outcome of the mingling of blood, of the merging of cultures and of common historical, social, and economic experience."

Following is the section most favored by U.S. commentaries:

"We reiterate our adherence of the principles of legal equality of States, their territorial integrity, self-determination of peoples, ideological pluralism, respect for human rights, non-intervention and international cooperation, good faith in the fulfillment of obligations, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and the prohibition of the threat or use of force and of armed aggression or economic or financial aggression in relations between States...we...condemn and repudiate colonial situations...condemn the use of nuclear energy for purposes other than peaceful ones conducive to the progress and well-being of our peoples..."

Once again, the concept of economic security through self-determination emerges:

"The creation of a society with full national decision-making powers requires an end to economic dependence through the determination and achievement of development objectives appropriate to the real needs of each of our peoples."

"The full exercise of sovereignty over their own natural resources, protection of the prices of raw materials, regulation of foreign investment and control over the activities of transnational corporations are inalienable rights of our countries."

"Integration is the most effective instrument of development and ensures economic independence by linking

national efforts to the complementarity of our economies.

"The acute world economic crisis manifests the need...for the establishment of a system of collective economic security which will make possible the integral development of peoples for their well-being, in a climate of stability, free from threats and coercion that might undermine it, in order to achieve a new international economic order which must be based on the equity, equality, sovereignty, interdependence, common interest, and co-operation of all States." [Ref. 11: pp. 54-56]

2. Ideology and Human Rights

In the realm of modern foreign policy on Latin America, a prepared statement of Judge Thomas Buergenthal, Dean of Washington College of Law, American University, emphasizes the importance of ideas, linking human rights and the national interest, which was the title of his statement:

"...few other U.S. foreign policy initiatives have been as misunderstood and as poorly articulated as has our human rights policy. The level of debate on this subject has been...Sophomoric, and that is true of the arguments of its proponents and its opponents. Part of the blame rests with President Carter and the fact that he promoted the policy with the righteous rhetoric of a fundamentalist sermon so that much of the discussion of the subject took on a moralistic tone. And the few efforts that were made by the Carter Administration to justify the policy to the public in terms of our national interest did not get much of a hearing..."

It was unfortunate that the articulation of the human rights policy was not translatable to the national interest. To Carter the transition was plain. The denial of arms would lead to the practice of human rights, creating a more contented polity and more suitable climate for democracy. Approaching the other extreme, Reagan's administration does not allow for the connection that puts human right in the national interest.

"The current Administration...spokesmen criticize and reject a strong human rights policy because they see it

as having purely moral but very little, if any political significance...they contend that the U.S. faces a formidable adversary in Soviet expansionism and cannot afford the luxury of being the moral policeman of the world...that the U.S. needs allies and cannot afford to alienate friendly anti-communist governments even if they are repressive..."

Buerghenthal stresses the importance of the role of morality and values in U.S. ideology, which has been a point of contention in determination of the national interest. Both authors and practitioners of power-based national interests have already been discussed. Once the air of debate settles, one is impressed that the power struggle approach to world affairs essentially consists in the mutual abhorrence for the concepts supported by our governments. Thus, ideology proves to be at the root of the bipolar conflict. *

"I agree that the Soviet Union and what it stands for presents the most serious threat to the U.S. national interest. But the threat is not only military or subversive, it is also ideological and it must therefore be confronted on the ideological level as well. In today's world, ideology is as much a weapon as is sophisticated weaponry. A sound human rights policy provides the United States with an ideology that distinguishes us most clearly from the Soviet Union and seriously undercuts the ideological appeal of Communism. It is the only ideology...that the people of the United States share with the vast majority of the people of the second and third worlds..."

"If we do not grasp the political and emotional significance of the human rights movement, we shall forfeit the only real competitive advantage we have in the struggle to contain Soviet expansionism and counteract its influence in the developing world." [Ref. 23: pp. 96-97]

*If only we could contain these objections with an attitude of vive la difference, having a guarded respect for the opposing ideology is a toll to our own perfection...

E. MORALISTS

As has been mentioned, Morgenthau introduced the concept of a moralist acting accidentally in the national interest, exemplified by Woodrow Wilson. In Latin American policy, regarding the military revolt of Victoriano Huerta in Mexico, Wilson added a new principle to the Latin American policy of the United States: opposition to governments established by force in violation of the constitution and against the will of the people. It declared that he wished to "cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents." [Ref. 9: p. 175] He held "that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval." Through mutual respect and helpfulness we would lend our influence to the realization of those principles,

"...knowing that disorder, personal intrigues, and defiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit government and injure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to have their common life and their common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition...

"The United States has nothing to seek in Central or South America except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the profit and advantage of both and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither." [Ref. 9: p. 175].

1. Carter's Human Rights Policy

Once again, the Carter execution of human rights surfaces as the soon to be classic example of moralism going sour. While President Carter is inevitably associated with the human rights policy, the fact is that it had been drawn up and discussed during the decade before his presidency. Being a morally inclined individual, and the one to actually sign the convention, he was the optimal candidate to be its standard bearer.

2. Kissinger on Human Rights

Following are exemplary diplomatic expressions of Henry Kissinger, a statesman in office closer in time to the origins of human rights as a policy. Not known for his moralism, Kissinger reveals that for a mixed audience, he can champion American ideals with the best of them. The following excerpts were taken from his statement before the General Assembly of the Organization of the American States, in which he appeals to liberty being the heritage of our collective civilization, referring to "our" hemisphere as "the hope of all mankind." [Ref. 13: p. 1]

"The precious common heritage of our Western Hemisphere is the conviction that human beings are the subjects, not the objects, of public policy, that citizens must not become mere instruments of the state.

"This is...the commitment that has made political freedom and individual dignity the constant and cherished ideal of the Americas and the envy of nations elsewhere. It is the ultimate proof that our countries are linked by more than geography and the impersonal forces of history.

"Respect for the rights of man is written into the founding documents of every nation of our hemisphere." [Ref. 13: p. 1]

He continues, discussing the benefits and plagues of the modern age, one of them being the "yearning for order even at the expense of liberty" resulting too often in the violation of the "fundamental standards of humane conduct." Alluding to the specter of the Great External Threat to the free world by admitting the shortcomings of this age in eradicating "intimidation, terror, and brutality--fostered sometimes from outside national territories and sometimes from inside..." [Ref. 13: p. 1] the realist reminds those present that Communism is the root of all evil.

Secretary Kissinger recommended the strengthening of the OAS Human Rights Commission so that

"we can deepen our dedication to the special qualities of rich promise that make our hemisphere a standard-bearer for freedom-loving people in every quarter of the globe."

"At the same time, we should also consider ways to strengthen the inter-American system in terms of protection against terrorism, kidnaping, and other forms of violent threats to the human personality, especially those inspired from the outside." [Ref. 13: p. 4]

It was after the Administrations to which Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State that the signing of the American Convention on Human Rights at the Pan-American Union took place. On this occasion, Carter recalled the conference on Human Rights in Costa Rica where the Convention was drawn up in 1969, and reminisced that "the aspirations...of human freedom and the responsibility of government to protect the rights of individuals" [Ref. 14: pp. 1-5] have existed among all North and South American countries since their formation.

Carter's "unrealism" was voiced by his Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia M. Derian. In her announcement that the human rights policy had strengthened U.S. interests in at least three ways, she proclaimed:

"First...Our willingness to press for human rights progress among our friends, as well as with our adversaries, has increased the credibility of our commitment to freedom. Thus, our human rights policy has generated widespread support for the United States throughout the world...

"Second, the policy helps insure friendly relations over the long run with other countries...We must not espouse a policy which leads a government to be hostile to U.S. interests because of U.S. ties with a prior regime that practiced oppression.

"Third, our policy...is the bedrock of our security. It is our special commitment to human freedom and dignity that makes us unique. Support for or indifference to oppression in other countries weakens the foundation of our own democracy at home." [Ref. 15: p. 52]

In entertaining the problem of costs associated with the application of the policy to arms transfers, she claimed:

"...the policy has produced considerable good will for the United States throughout Latin America. Our relations with constitutional governments are much closer than before. And our stand for human rights has won respect from peoples throughout the hemisphere. Any possible transitory or short-term loss of influence with a particular regime must be balanced against these more durable and long-term gains." [Ref. 15: p. 52]

Ms. Derian went on to rationalize that any economic costs due to applying the policy to arms transfers could be justified as an investment in the future, for "our policy has made a major and significant difference--both for the victims of oppression and for our own national interest." [Ref. 15: pp. 53]

3. Reagan's Non-moralistic Arms Policy

As is in keeping with the tradition of our unique exercise of the democratic system, the succeeding president's new policy on arms transfers is differing considerably and can be attributed to personality, approach, political party, and conservative inclinations. His aim is "peace through strength", and the thrust of his arms

transfer policy is expressed in the sentence, "Prudently pursued, arms transfers can strengthen us."

It is perhaps the major distinction of the American miracle that such change can be absorbed and considered an improvement rather than a defamation of what has been changed. The evaluation of "whether approval or denial of the transfer (of arms) would best promote 'the international recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms,'" [Ref. 16: pp. 74-75] is still an important factor in arms transfer requests.

F. SUMMARY OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA

The quotes offered in this chapter were intended to verbalize our national interests in Latin America. The latter ones exemplify a means for preserving those interests through a policy. Some of those national interests, in a few words, are: maintenance of the balance of power; collective security; anti-communism; political stability; preservation of free trade; economic stability. The following paragraphs summarize how the citations exemplify the national interests.

1. Balance of Power

Early disinvolvement with the balance of power gave way to the post World War change of major actors on the scale. So the balance became a U.S. national interest. The role of arms transfers in that interest is stated in the factors that must be considered in evaluating Latin American arms requests:

"Whether the transfer will strengthen a friendly government in areas of particular security concern to the United States, such as the Caribbean Basin and the South Atlantic, and whether the arms in question would help deter the threat of aggression or subversion by our mutual adversaries in those areas..."

"Whether denial of the transfer would lead the purchaser to turn to sources of supply and enter into security relationships that are detrimental to the United States and U.S. interests in Latin America." [Ref. 16: p. 72]

2. Collective Security

"Whether the transfer will enhance the recipient's capability to participate in collective security efforts with the United States" was also cited as a "consideration" for requests. [Ref. 16: pp. 72-73].

3. Anti-communism

U.S. preoccupation with Soviet Communism manifests itself as well in the national interest of political stability: arms transfers must be "consistent with our interest in maintaining regional peace and stability, or whether it could inadvertently contribute to tensions or disputes among countries of the region." [Ref. 16: p. 73] Any instability is seen as a perfect climate for the introduction of a new ideology. So the United States, incidentally, undertakes to destabilize in Latin America or elsewhere, when necessary for the preservation of democracy.

4. Free Trade and Economic Interdependence

Interests in free trade and economic interdependence were seen emphasized in the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and others before and after him. The following quote of Ronald Reagan refers not only to those interests, but pinpoints the area of concern in Latin America, encapsulating almost all of current national interests there:

"...nearness on the map does not even begin to tell the strategic importance of Central America, bordering as it does on the Caribbean--our lifeline to the outside world. Two-thirds of all our foreign trade and petroleum pass through the Panama Canal and the Caribbean. In a

European crisis, at least half of our supplies for NATO would go through these areas by sea... Because of its importance, the Caribbean Basin is a magnet for adventurism..." [Ref. 17: p. 6]

In conclusion, U.S./Latin American relations may not be so easily repaired by the artful reversal of policy that still manages to uphold the cause of human rights, but the hypothesis is not that realists affect U.S. arms transfer policy favorably while moralist presidents serve to its detriment. No policy, program, idea, or philosophy is an answer in and of itself. Reagan's stance on arms transfers is less judgmental, but this one policy does not permeate all actions with respect to Latin America such that his departure from moralism on that issue can cure all ills between us. What is necessary is a mechanism in the American government through which moralizing and imposing our standards on other cultures can be reserved to rhetoric. While nations of the Western way of thinking generally do subscribe to moral ideals, not a single one, even those who realize their weakness and need for protection by industrialized and prosperous countries, can accept preaching and paternalism.

The mechanism may be a decision-making body in the U.S. government impressing a "mortal danger" and overriding a moral presidential inclination, or a realist president rationalizing U.S. self-preservation. Regardless, the U.S. acts in its national interests based on power realities, and yet thinks, expresses, and deeply believes the motivation for all actions is a question of good vs. evil, right vs. wrong. The communist ideology being the greatest of all evils, any "lesser" evils such as terrorism are seen as encouraged by its mere existence, rather than acknowledged as a national interest as "vital" as those more directly related to communism. Thus, most U.S. national interests in

Latin America-- democratization, free trade, political and economic stability, human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, non-intervention-- revolve around and are often subordinated to the concept of East versus West. Democracy wears the white hat, while Communism parades in the villain's clothes, manipulating weaker governments to a frenzy of instability so that it can later come to the rescue. While we are markedly improving in our realization of the importance of the lesser developed players in the world scenario, the U.S. is still obsessed by the country with the biggest bullets.

IV. CONDITIONS IN THE RECIPIENT

This chapter will deal with economic and politico-military conditions in Latin America and Brazil, and the effect of these factors on the armed forces and arming of those areas.

To reiterate the questions brought up in the Introduction to the thesis:

What economic interests in Latin America are of concern to the U.S.? How did the Latin American/Brazilian economic situation come about? What can be done to remedy the problems to benefit the U.S. and Latin America? Can economic benefits result from arms trade? How does the case country of Brazil exemplify these benefits?

What is the political situation in Brazil compared to the rest of Latin America? How do political circumstances influence arms sales? How do Latin American arms purchases compare with the rest of the world? What are the implications of Latin American arms purchase patterns in terms of regional restraint? What political factors in Brazil have a bearing on their arms industry and its future?

What is the magnitude of armed forces in Latin America? To what extent are arms purchased indigenously there? How great is the capacity to absorb sophisticated arms obtained outside Latin America? What are incentives for arms purchase?

A. ECONOMIC

1. Interest rates

North-South economic interdependence, delicate at best, is a serious national interest of the U.S. The typical headline topic is concerned with the problem of American failure to bring down interest rates. Following are a few manifestations of this problem: (1) It is disrupting the world economy, forcing the values of other currencies to go down and making it harder for affected economies to recover. (2) With Latin American countries needing loans for development projects, the industrialized countries continue extending them and resceduling paybacks so that bankruptcy, which would cause the collapse of their economies, will not be declared. (3) Since the only way developing countries can repay debts is to be able to increase their exports, it introduces complications. A specific example is the U.S. importing items such as the Brazil's Bandeirante airplane, and not buying a similar aircraft domestically [Ref. 18: p. 12].

Other significant Latin American economic problems center around dependence on world trade and the fall of direct foreign investment (DFI). These will be discussed in turn. But first mention must be made of how the critical economic situation in Latin America came about.

One explanation for the Brazilian and other Latin American economies to have fallen into such a state is offered by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Washington-based financial arm of the Organization of the American States. In its annual report it said that the economic product for Latin America as a whole fell one percent last year. In contrast, between the years 1964 and 1980, it had never fallen below four percent in any given year. The IDB gives this as a reason for the Latin American

countries to borrow so heavily in anticipation of future growth. [Ref. 19: p. 371] In Brazil, three factors are responsible for high external indebtedness: (1) the excessive push to industrialize at a high cost; (2) extensive public sectors; (3) erratic exchange and interest rates [Ref. 20: p.354]. The first two are supportive of the IDB's remark about over-optimistic predictions regarding world economy.

2. Trade

In the realm of trade, primary products prices other than oil are at the lowest levels for thirty years. Latin America derives over one-third of its export revenues from oil, and as much again from the sale of other primary commodities. Brazil has virtually no oil, and despite inclinations toward greater industrialization, it still relies heavily on such primary products as coffee and sugar cane.

Because of rapid population growth, it is particularly vulnerable to a severe downturn in world trade. The higher the population, the greater demand for employment creation, new infrastructure and services: all expansionary policies that soak up imports.

3. Direct Investment

Before explaining the meaning of DFI, the following description of Brazil's economic development status is offered in a comparison of Brazil and Mexico on transnational corporations and development. The authors of the study see Brazil as neither "developed" nor "peripheral," which is another way to refer to "advanced," "developing," or "lesser developed" countries. The reasons for its non-developed classification are: (1) its low gross domestic product; (2) its highly skewed domestic income; (3) it is a recipient, not a source of foreign investment; (4) it is a

debtor, not a creditor; (5) its lack of complexity in productive structure. [Ref. 21: p. 31]

It is classified as non-peripheral because: (1) it is industrialized; (2) it is diversified in its manufactured exports; (3) it is a strong state with sophisticated administration to promote and protect local interests. [Ref. 21: p. 31]

In trying to graduate from a semiperipheral to a developed state, Brazil relied on direct foreign investment, which is the acquisition or control of productive facilities outside the country [Ref. 21: p.32].

Since the seventies, Brazil has been trying to expand local production of capital goods and diversify export promotion. The importance of finance capital (loans) relative to DFI has increased, especially in light of the wish to move up from the semiperiphery. Commercial banks relying on government guarantees are taking over from DFI capital. investment, hence increasing the burden of external indebtedness. Although it is not the first time Latin America was in such a predicament, this time cutbacks in domestic economies may have to be quite drastic in order to remedy the situation.

4. Possible Solutions

Measures dependent on the world economy such as increased aid, raising of commodity prices, eliminating import barriers, providing International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans more easily, and lowering interest rates are quite unpredictable. Thus, other factors such as devaluation of currency are undertaken, leading to internal discontent about resulting inflation and austerity measures. Such is the case in Brazil, in whose large cities former businessmen are "daylighting" as peddlers, and supermarkets are scenes of rioting and looting.

A look at new developments in trade patterns indicates a brighter outlook. While primary products still comprise the bulk of exports, there has been a rise in the export of sophisticated manufactures, for example, Brazilian airplanes and tanks. Other trends show a rise in Latin American intra-regional trade and diversification towards new markets. Agencies have been established promoting transactions within the region, among them the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market, and the "Latin American Economic System" (SELA). On the latter trend, European Economic Community protectionism thwarts Latin America's attempts to direct trade away from U.S. dependence.

It remains, however, for Latin America to overcome its long-standing trading problems of continued over-dependence on a few primary products, extreme vulnerability to fluctuations in U.S. economic policy, and a tendency towards unsustainable rates of foreign indebtedness. [Ref. 22: pp. 28-30]

5. Exports as a Remedy

Following is an example of what can arms transfers do for the U.S. as supplier in terms of economic development. Note that the data, which treats of Argentina, is not strictly arms exports related data, but it gives an idea of what trade with a large Latin American economy can do for U.S. economic interests.

"The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that:
--every billion dollars worth of exports creates 40,000 to 50,000 jobs
--every 1 million jobs creates in taxes (corporate and individual) \$22 billion in revenue to the U.S. Treasury.

Thus, if the U.S. had obtained only 50 per cent, instead of 2.86 per cent of these sales, we would have provided 160,000 to 200,000 additional jobs and some \$3.5 to \$4.4 billion additional revenue to the Treasury.

And this is for Argentina alone.

If the U.S removed current disincentives to exports and increased its ratio of exports to GNP by only 1 or 2 percentage points we would easily balance the domestic budget, eliminate our trade deficit, and gainfully employ another 1.6 million Americans. It is time for the Congress to quit penalizing American industry and workers for the alleged sins of others." [Ref. 12: p. 32]

These noteworthy figures make it appear that there are indeed economic benefits to arms trade. Also, it might be considered imperative that the U.S. use arms sales to maintain good relations with Mexico and Venezuela for interests in their petroleum.

a. Critics of Arms Trade

Those who are skeptical of the economic benefits of arms transfers argue that:

--earnings from weapons exports cover only a small fraction of U.S. oil import bills, and arms sales constitute only four to five percent of total U.S. exports, thereby contributing relatively little to its balance of payments.

--contrary to the quoted example of Argentina, if sale of arms were significantly curtailed, "no serious unemployment problems would result."

--few top U.S. defense contractors depend on overseas sales for their economic survival.

--there is no significant unit cost savings or recoupment of research and development costs for Pentagon purchases as a result of most of the military items and services sold by the U.S. to other countries.

--even when Americans deny weapons sales, nations do not always resort to other suppliers. [Ref. 3: p. 59]

*After this pitch to Congress was made, embargoes not only to Argentina were lifted or being considered.

Brazil, one of the countries that has emerged as an important regional actor as a result of the "erosion of the bipolar system" [Ref. 24: p. 132], is a good example of Latin American commercial arms relations being more important than the political ones. This commercial attitude differs from both the policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, "for which monetary considerations are usually secondary to their political and strategic interests."

b. Brazilian Arms Exporting

In Brazil, as elsewhere, exports seem to be a key to debt problems. Arms sales are not only a reliable source of considerable foreign exchange and hard currency, but for barter as well. Although the government has been decreasing its spending, production of military equipment is not expected to be affected, since hardware exports are a growing source of foreign exchange. Brazilian weapons and its sales policy appeal to Third World buyers; they're simple, inexpensive, and the purchasers are free to resell them at any time [Ref. 25: p.9]. "Although a military-backed regime with distinctly right-winged persuasions, the Brazilian government will do business with anybody, whatever their political hue, and one plank of foreign policy is that the current obsession with East-West rivalry is not for Brazil, particularly because it is bad for business." [Ref. 26: p. 26] "Brazil is in the fortunate position of having no open enemies or frontier problems with its neighbors, which facilitates its open-door arms sale policy." In the words of the Brazilian minister of aviation: "the Brazilian arms industry produces to sell. If a customer appears from Soviet Russia, Japan, or China who wants to buy, we will sell." [Ref. 34: p. 15]

Brazil has a double objective in expanding and diversifying its arms industry: (1) It wants to promote self sufficiency in arms and technology so as to strengthen the nation's security and to reduce its dependence on foreign sources of supply. (2) It wants to increase the sales of armaments abroad as a stimulus to national and development of technology, and to benefit the country's economy through much-needed foreign exchange earnings and the training and employment of skilled labor. [Ref. 27: p. 15]

B. POLITICAL

The political discussions of arms transfers in Latin America can be divided into politico-military factors in all of Latin America, and Brazilian politics, military, geopolitical, and future.

1. Politico-military

The politics of Latin America is difficult to discuss without interrelating them with arms and the military. These relationships will be expanded upon by providing some background on incentives to purchase or to manufacture arms, the status of arms spending in Latin America as compared to the rest of the world, and the possibilities for Latin America to be the first area to exercise regional arms restraint.

2. Incentives toward Arms Purchase

A trend toward increased purchase of advanced arms by the developing world set in during the 70's. The monetary amount tripled in constant dollars between 1969 and 1978. Raw data on overall military expenditures from 1971 to 1980 using a sampling of eleven Latin American countries, large and small, proves this at a glance.

Historic origins of the trend are found in the breakup of colonial empires, Andrew Pierre explains. In order to show sovereignty, national military establishments under command of the head of state were created. Arms served as a symbol of strength and status; providing arms was a way to gain the loyalty of the armed forces to political leadership. In turn, the military system was a route to political power. [Ref. 24: pp. 131-132]

Encapsulating reasons for the trends toward becoming more heavily armed, almost all of these apply somewhere in Latin America: The perception of national security requirements based upon real conflict or perceived threat; the dominance of the armed forces; the availability of money in some oil-rich nations (Venezuela, Mexico) with which to purchase weapons; the interest of outside powers in arming their allies to wage war by proxy (Cuba, Nicaragua); the general diffusion of power. [Ref. 24: p. 132]

3. Arms Spending in Latin America

Insofar as how the region of Latin America compares to the rest of the developing world in terms of U.S. interest in transferring arms, the amount of increase in arms to Latin America is small in comparison with the Middle East [Ref. 24: p. 134], which increased twenty-fold next to Latin America's three-fold between 1969 and 1978. While even that tripling is a respectable augmentation, it may hint at certain rationales of the U.S. as a major supplier in those figures: these U.S. concerns override its interests in Latin America: (1) national interests in oil resources in the middle east; (2) U.S. pro-Israel inclination due to its Jewish population; (3) the greater proximity of the middle east region to the Soviet Union. Even though Mexico and Venezuela are rich in oil, it appears more important to the U.S. to maintain friendship, influence, and

leverage with the strategically placed, resource-rich Middle East regions than the Latin American ones. ¹⁰ Compared to the rest of the world, the following figures show Latin America's status: [Ref. 28]

Latin American Arms Expenditures

WORLD TOTAL (in millions).....	\$28,400
DEVELOPING WORLD.....	\$22,400
OPEC.....	\$8,900
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA.....	\$700
ARGENTINA.....	\$70
BRAZIL.....	\$160
CHILE.....	\$110
COLOMBIA.....	\$20
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND EL SALVADOR.....	\$5
ECUADOR.....	\$40
GUATEMALA.....	\$20
HONDURAS.....	\$10
MEXICO.....	\$10
NICARAGUA.....	\$10
PANAMA.....	\$10
PARAGUAY.....	\$5
PERU.....	\$90
URUGUAY.....	\$10
VENEZUELA.....	\$120

¹⁰It must, however, be acknowledged that the issue of greater attention to the middle east is becoming old news. Additionally, dependence on its oil is not that much heavier than in other oil-rich areas. The cumulative figures in this case do not tell the story of the sales of fighter planes to Venezuela, or of oil rights in Mexico. Nor do they express any of the much-vocalized concern over a myriad of hispanic-related issues, among which are the policing of illegal immigration, and bilingualism. Domestically, a long overdue and much-to-be-welcomed hispanic lobby is coming closer to realization.

Latin American countries have dealt with a great diversity of suppliers in the wake of U.S. imposed difficulties or lack of interest in arms transfers with Latin America. A reason for declined interest may be that U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere is not as important as it was in the years before World War II. Such a statement implies U.S. control in the situation, and appears as though no care has been taken to discern that other nations decisions on their defense budgets can be made with many nations of the world in mind, outside of the United States.

4. Possibilities for Regional Restraint

Remembering that the Latin American region is the one area in the world that has approached consensus on restraints, Latin America simply doesn't spend a great deal on importing arms. Between 1969 and 1978, Latin America bought only 5% of arms imported by developing countries. Most countries spend less than 2% of their Gross National Product on weapons, with the exception of Peru, Chile, and Cuba. Both the Declaration of Ayacucho and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, described in preceding and following chapters, lend credence to the possibility that Latin America may be the world's first region to agree on arms limitations.

5. Brazilian Politics

Brazil has a population of over 120 million. Their leadership in Brasilia is dependent on the cooperation of business and technocratic elite in Sao Paulo and Rio in running the country. Defense and aspects of foreign policy remain under control of the military. The armed forces leaders are very nationalistic, and have aspirations of Brazil becoming a great power. They are independent in foreign policy, and especially more distant from the U.S. since the Carter Administration.

The political system is undergoing a transition from military to civilian domination and there is much anticipation as to public behavior when the process is final. "The military, which is to end its rule soon, has kept a tight lid on expressions of social dissent since taking power in 1964. But with new opposition party governors in 10 Brazilian state houses, this situation could change. 'They have to show they're different, they can't repress in the same way,'" said a well-known leftist sociologist [Ref. 29: 344]. Apparently this leftist academic feels that it is in the Brazilian sociological makeup to take to the streets, a practice that has been suppressed since the military took over after the last great political outpourings in 1964. It is well to discuss the nineteen years of conditions between civilian administrations.

a. Brazilian Geopolitical Factors

Societies in Latin America are so fragmented that the military arise as the ruling class out of lack of national consensus. The Brazilian military elite feel they have a civilizing mission to perform in their rule of the country, as do many leaders in Latin America. Since Brazil's coup in 1964, the generals in power undertook to modernize, promote free enterprise, instill efficient tax systems, and reinforce the state's economic authority.

Such measures characterize a less militant concept of rule than the stereotype of the hawkish Latin American general. The leaders have "internalized civilian feelings. They generally don't interfere except to restore conditions for the free exercise of democracy when hampered by incapable, demagogic, or corrupt politicians." [Ref. 30: p. 363]

Influenced by geopolitics, the objectives of the professional military at that time were to develop the interior, provide security for the South Atlantic, and demonstrate leadership in the Third World [Ref. 24: p. 237].

The Johnson Administration, then in power in the U.S., was in favor of Brazilian foreign policy goals, which were "to defend the security of the continent against aggression and subversion whether internal or external." [Ref. 31: p. 56] In 1965, the regime set up an economic stabilization program also very much favored by the United States. It undertook to curtail government spending, increase tax revenue, tighten credit, and squeeze wages. The political system was altered. The constitution was rewritten, the decision-making powers of the president were strengthened, thirteen previously existing political parties were narrowed down to two, and the Supreme Court was enlarged. [Ref. 31: p.54]

During that year, the new military government set up the Industria de Materia Belico do Brasil, or IMBEL, whose objective it was to make Brazil as self-sufficient as possible in arms. In keeping with this philosophy, the armed forces employ second echelon Brazilian-made equipment over advanced weapons from abroad.

b. Future of Brazilian Politics

In 1985, the first presidential election in years will probably be done by the Electoral College, even though Brazilian public opinion favors open selection. Since "the process of choosing a President in Brazil has always set off disputes," [Ref. 32: p. 335] the event may set the stage for more of the same. In such nations as Brazil where civilian leaders may negotiate arms enhancement, the public in support of arms as symbols of prestige will react favorably to the democratic means that put those civilians in power.

c. Implications for U.S. Relations

The preceding provided perspective on economic, political, and military national interests in arms dealings concerning Brazil. Despite the appearances of strained relations with the United States, the Brazilians have not been entirely non-supportive of such U.S. national interests as democratization and human rights. In fact, with current Brazilian President Figueredo's policy of abertura or opening, many measures have been taken to ease civil pressures in the realm of violent punishment as well as to yield more freedom to average citizens. Tight controls on political activity have been relaxed, and opponents of the regime have been allowed to return from abroad [Ref. 33: p. 77]. When the Brazilian government cut off military relations with the U.S., it was more coincidental than intentional that it happened at a time when their wish to manifest independence and U.S. paternalism peaked. The Reagan Administration has been reversing the stance on arms sales, although this will probably not interest the self-determining Brazilians to reconsider government arms deals. Relations through the small U.S. attache mission there now, coupled with commercial affiliations in the Brazilian arms industry seem to strike the medium of Brazilian independence from the U.S. government while the United States can be assured of playing a part in their manufacture through dependence on some American components.

C. ARMED FORCES, THE ARMS INDUSTRY, AND INCENTIVES FOR USE

Having discussed politics and the military, it is necessary to give more mention of the arms industries in Latin America, as well as the capacity of non-arms producing countries to absorb sophisticated imported weapons technology.

In all of Latin America, only Argentina and Brazil have significant arms industries. Both assemble and produce subsonic aircraft and various weapons, some under license, some in cooperation with other countries, such as France or Italy.

1. Relative Size of Forces within Latin America

Brazil and Argentina also happen to have the largest military forces in Latin America, while other countries have more per thousand people. Brazil and Venezuela were in keeping with the Latin American average of four military per thousand between the years 1971 through 1980. Argentina and Peru had a higher number, averaging six per thousand. Chile was the highest with ten on the average, whereas Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala had two military in a thousand, and Honduras had three. The most interesting figures were for Nicaragua, whose troops went up from an average of three for seven years up to ten in 1979, and then to twenty in 1980.

Focusing on Brazil, this commentary is informative: "According to London's Institute of Strategic Studies, the Brazilian armed forces are efficient and modern, with 85 percent of their equipment of national fabrication. With the Army numbering 188,000 men and nearly 400,000 reservists, the Navy 47,000, and the Air Force 43,000, Brazil constitutes the strongest military force in Latin America." [Ref. 27: p. 15]

2. Absorptive Capacity

With regard to the question of absorptivity, Brazil has a high capacity; whereas in the rest of Latin America, no blanket statement can be made. Differences in basic economic, technological, educational, and military infrastructure must all be taken into account. The significance of

the question is obviated when it is considered that throughout Latin America, sophisticated equipment has been modestly if not fully utilized to serve a useful and symbolic purpose [Ref. 1: p. 45].

3. Incentives for Use

To have full comprehension of purposes for which arms might be used, one must be familiar with the possible threats and challenges to national security in Latin America. Among them are border conflicts and insurgency.

a. Border Conflicts, Boundary Disputes, and External Threats

Several pairs of Latin American countries have been carrying on feuds for as long as a hundred years or more. Considering the length of such unrest, it appears that the disputes are not of the magnitude to result in full-scale war. Rather they seem to continue for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that most Latin Americans do not forget an injury to their pride. Other explanations for these nearly perpetual conflicts include the potential to divert attention away from domestic problems, and a paradox that breaks up fraternity, transforming it into sibling rivalry. The latter may be related to an aspect in machismo elevating the status of fighting to that of a respected art.

The countries engaged in quarrels are Argentina and Chile, who are at arms about a "parting of the waters" issue in the Beagle Channel which would determine the ownership of the Lannox, Nueva, and Picton Islands there, as well as an Atlantic inlet for Chile. Peru and Ecuador are fighting over a badly demarcated twenty thousand square mile area known as "the Amazonian triangle." Ecuador and Honduras, and the latter with Nicaragua, are also experi-

encing territorial conflicts. These rivalries will be discussed in context with arms races.

Brazil's most immediate external threat comes from the Rio de la Plata region in the south where it has been in disagreement with Paraguay and Argentina over water rights.

b. Insurgency

Ideal conditions for insurgency involve an appropriate combination of civilization and wilderness. Those areas "nearer to concentrations of population, forested mountains have the greatest potential." [Ref. 35: p. 60]. They provide the best cover, are the least open to traffic, are relatively safe from aircraft operations. According to this description, the largest part of Brazil is exempt from the problem, for its patterns of settlement are so arranged that surrounding areas have only a moderate potential for insurgency. Any Central or South American countries with highland forests near sufficient population can shelter insurgents. Thus, the smaller countries and islands are prime; Argentina has low potential, and so do Uruguay and Paraguay. This is not to say that any country not fitting the description for likelihood of insurgency will never spawn small belligerent forces.

c. Arms Buildups after Old Conflicts

Arms might also be procured for the prestige of being ahead in arms supplies. A semblance of an arms race in Latin America is concentrated in what is known as the Southern Cone of South America. There are two factors contributing to such competition in that location. One is the conflict over the Beagle Channel between Chile and Argentina, and the other is the Argentines' belligerence against Great Britain concerning the Malvinas. The

Chilean-Argentine dispute over the ownership of the islands of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva, near Tierra del Fuego, and jurisdiction over the maritime zone surrounding them has caused the two countries to significantly build up the military along their borders. [Ref. 35: p. 338] The result is Chile striving for parity with its neighbor who is stepping up and modernizing arms purchases in the aftermath of its colonial war.

Peru and Chile continue to build up arms as a legacy of a war fought a century ago in which Peru lost its southern territories. Ecuador, fearing that Peruvian arms could be used to seize its oil fields, has also been drawn into the race [Ref. 3: p. 53]. In the rest of Latin America, military hardware sought due to acquisitions by neighbors do not contribute to unnecessary arms inventories. Adjacent countries likely to engage in "copy-cat" purchases are Venezuela-Colombia, and Guatemala-Nicaragua. [Ref. 1: p. 41]

D. COMMENTARY

Considering the economic, political, and military conditions as stated, it would be in both the short and long term national interests of the United States to enable Brazil to improve its economy through minimal U.S. antagonism of the Brazilian arms industry. This would be a role to be played by military attaches, who are the vestiges of a formerly healthy military assistance program, and also by commercial sales representatives.

V. CONDITIONS IN U.S. CONDUCTIVE TO ARMS DEALS WITH RECIPIENT

A. INTRODUCTION

"Much of the criticism of the United States policy in the military field shows a lack of understanding of the principle that political objectives determine military policies...designed...to gain Latin America's friendship, to win its cooperation and support in the U.N. and the O.A.S..." [Ref. 37: p. 226] "...neither the official U.S. military objectives nor the means of attaining them make sense in terms of the real conditions in Latin America...objectives of U.S. military are primarily political...the 1947 Rio Treaty had been justified by the concept of collective security and by the assumption of the threat of aggression." [Ref. 37: p. 218]

"The Nixon Doctrine...marked the beginning of an American retrenchment and a decision to rely...on more indirect ways of upholding U.S. security interests. In particular, arms transfers came to be increasingly used as a substitute for a high military presence in a region." [Ref. 4: p. 24]

Such philosophies may well have applied to U.S. dealings with Latin America during those times. It is no news, however, for a supplier country to let arms transfer agreements serve the purpose of supporting national security interests. Using the framework of rationales put forth by Keap and Miller in their article "the Arms Transfer Phenomenon," those reasons applicable to the United States

in its significant arms dealings with Latin American countries will be named.

The authors divided supplier rationales into the categories of costs and benefits. Both costs and benefits were broken down into their political, military, and economic aspects. Military benefits, however, were specified as direct and indirect. Costs included sociological ramifications, and only direct military effects. All three aspects in the "benefit" category will be discussed. Costs will be treated only in terms of the political (which in Latin America often overlaps with the economic and the military) and sociological.

B. BENEFITS

1. Political Benefits

The three main political benefits are those of symbolism and friendship, influence, and leverage. As a Rand study on the subject area aptly stated:

"Arms transfers are diplomacy by other means. Having arms, especially prestigious arms, appears to be essential for the successful conduct of traditional diplomacy. Indeed, arms have often been more important for their diplomatic symbolism than for their military capabilities."

"...The lessening of United States influence in Latin America and the expansion of intra-regional relations probably mean that military diplomacy, based in part on the acquisition of prestigious weapons, will be increasingly significant in the conduct of intra-hemispheric relations and in the resolution of potential conflicts."
[Ref. 38: p. 39]

Another method of gaining influence which includes arms transfers is through security assistance programs. In what is better defined as mere presence and access in many instances, U.S. policy makers and bureaucrats are blinded by delusions of possibilities to control and understand the

effects of American presence in the recipient. Recent history in Nicaragua proves there is no way the U.S. can monitor the political consequences of our security assistance, especially arms transfers. [Ref. 1: p. 44]

Denial, rather than transfer of arms, had been used under the Carter Administration to provide some external leverage for inhibiting repressive practices in some countries. In other Administrations, on the other hand, it has been mentioned that U.S. arms have taken the place of human representation [Ref. 1: p. 42].

2. Military Benefits

Direct military benefits can be: support for military allies; support for friends; arms for base rights; arms in exchange for intelligence-gathering rights.

a. Support for Military Allies

The war over the Falklands/Malvinas islands proved to be a difficult situation for the United States. The fact that the U.S. declared support of and gave much practical help to the British in intelligence and logistics certainly did not enhance any rapprochement or hemispheric solidarity with Argentina. No transfers from the U.S. were made to either side during the conflict. Past provision of ships and other military equipment to our Rio Pact ally had long since been forgotten; that ancient hardware probably stood out as a reminder of the U.S. making it economically and otherwise infeasible for even comparatively well-off Argentina to buy sophisticated weapons.

b. Support for Base Rights

The question of possibly arms, (and probably more correctly stated military assistance) for base rights and for intelligence gathering rights is applicable in

Caribbean locations, particularly Panama. In order of preponderance, the United States has Army, Navy, and Air Force bases in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone. The U.S. Navy also has bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Chaguarasos, Trinidad. The United States Southern Command is headquartered at Quarry Heights in the Panama Canal Zone, and is responsible for administrative, training, and operational activities in support of security assistance efforts throughout Latin America. [Ref. 35: p. 3]

c. Indirect Military Benefits

The indirect military benefits are conventional arms transfers as a non-proliferation strategy, and use for testing combat equipment. Only the first of these will be addressed.

Through the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974, the Latin American countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela pledged that they would limit the acquisition of arms for offensive purposes. This declaration demonstrated that "...there has been more interest in Latin America than in any other area in developing regional restraints on armaments..." [Ref. 24: p. 233]

The Declaration of Ayacucho was cited earlier, bringing out its economic content. Its importance is not to be underestimated, but by the same token, the statements contained in it do not amount to much more than good intentions and a "state of the unions" proclamation.

The issue of non-proliferation, especially in a nuclear vein, has aroused concern over Brazil. Although it ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ten years later it was slow to enter into force due to certain preconditions among them the signature and ratification of the second Protocol

to the treaty by all powers possessing nuclear weapons [Ref. 39: p. 9]. The U.S. did so in 1971 [Ref. 39: p. 20], and in the year of the Senate hearing from which this information was drawn, the USSR had signed protocol II and was expected to ratify it.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America. The idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone originated in a proposal by Brazil in November 1962, and a joint declaration of the presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico in April 1963. Mexico took the lead in negotiating the legal framework, and it was finally signed in a suburb of Mexico City on February 14, 1967 by twenty-two countries.

The significance of the Treaty with respect to Brazil is that it was one of six countries not a party to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1978. Having ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco is regarded as an alternative way for non-NPT signatory states in Latin America to achieve the objectives of the NPT. [Ref. 39: p. 9]

Brazil's refusal to sign the NPT had to do with acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to verify that peaceful nuclear activities were not directed to the end of creating nuclear weapons [Ref. 39: p. 20].

Two possible reasons for Brazil's behavior follow: (1) Brazil is feeling the animosity encouraged by Carter's administration. (2) Having originated the idea of a Latin American nuclear-free-zone years before, it anticipated its declaration of non-proliferation in the Treaty of Tlatelolco once the preconditions were met.

The reason nuclear power is of special concern in Brazil is that in the mid-seventies it had entered into an agreement with West Germany through which it would be provided all "equipment, fuel, and technology needed to

develop nuclear weapons." [Ref. 40: p. 123] Not having signed the NPT, and possessing extensive uranium deposits, there is nothing the IAEA could do to prevent Brazil from becoming a nuclear weapons power [Ref. 40: p. 124].

Brazil, having conceived of the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone, appears to be forthright in its claim that its nuclear capability will not be used for other than peaceful purposes. To summarize, in Brazil's case, the transfer of conventional weapons does not derive the military benefit mentioned above. Nevertheless, the improving political relations between the U.S. and Brazil and the satisfactory commercial linkages to their arms industry do contribute to preserving Brazil's intentions for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. Economic Benefits

Economic benefits to be incurred from arms transfers are five: (1) arms sales contribute to a favorable balance of payments; (2) arms sales help relieve unemployment; (3) they reduce unit costs; (4) there are linkages between military and commercial sales; (5) arms may be transferred in exchange for resources.

a. Improvement of Balance of Payments

The effect of arms transfers from the U.S. to Latin America on U.S. balance of payments is negligible, considering how long it has been since any activity in arms transfer deals, what was transferred, (old World War II surplus) and the fact that U.S. prices have been prohibitively high, and our credit terms more stringent. This added to the considerations raised in the previous chapter suggest that Latin American arms transfers do not interest the U.S. in economic terms. That is, the transfer of U.S. arms to Latin America is not of as much interest as the rise of arms production in Argentina and in particular, Brazil.

b. Relief from Unemployment

Arms sales to Latin America would relieve unemployment, but it is rationalized that if they were cut from the status quo, no more serious unemployment problems would result.

4. Reduction of Unit Costs and Encouragement of Commercial Linkages

The benefit of reducing unit costs is contingent upon more activity than is prevalent between the U.S. and Latin America. Linkage between commercial and military sales is subject to the same commentary. However, in Brazil, an interesting pattern appears in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Military Assistance Program (MAP), and commercial expenditures shown in figure (1). Overall, until 1979, FMS, which involve government-to government transactions, followed a similar pattern with commercial sales. Conversely, between 1967 and 1968, and 1970 and 1972, FMS rose and commercial sales declined. Between 1974 and 1975, when FMS were taking a tremendous leap, commercial sales were almost level. In 1976, the FMS and commercial sales were at their highest, and nearly equal, at \$44 million. Both dove in 1977, declined somewhat until 1978, at which time FMS began a steady decline, opposed to commercial sales which continue to go up.

The significance of these findings is both economic and political. In the economic sense, they appear to prove the theory between military and commercial sales. Politically, the trends may be explained by presidential policy. Prior to the Carter administration, FMS were always higher than the commercial. Subsequent to that, after a period of levelling out. Commercial amounts are higher and increasing.

A similar study was done using Canada as the case country, chosen because of its relative freedom from human rights violations. In figure (2), it can be seen that there was no marked rise and fall around 1976 as there was in Brazil.

a. Arms for Resources

The agreement to sell F-16s to Venezuela is one instance of establishing a possible arms for resources relationship. Although some economic benefit is a consideration, no single economic or national security benefit is the motivation. The United States certainly has an interest in Venezuelan oil. The agreement to sell fighter planes to Venezuela bears that advantage and also that of good U.S. security relations with Venezuela as a presence in the Caribbean Basin area. Venezuela considers itself the gateway to South America, and is highly concerned with its crucial, strategic position.

C. COSTS

1. Political Costs

As is often the case for many issues in Latin America, political and military costs are intertwined. Direct and indirect political costs are: (1) reverse leverage; (2) cost of supplier's attempts to exert leverage; (3) indirect political cost--promotion of regional arms races

a. Reverse Leverage

Reverse leverage occurs when a so-called "weaker" (recipient) country gains an advantage through arms transfer or other relations and is in a position to manipulate the "stronger" one. In order to avoid such an

occurrence, a Rand Corporation publication of 1977 on arms transfer in Latin America mentioned two alternatives in arms transfer policy for the U.S.: pre-emptive dealings and considering the politico-military benefits of Latin America diversifying its arms suppliers. [Ref. 38: p. 54]

(1) Pre-emption: The first alternative recommends discouraging purchase of arms from other than the United States, not necessarily encouraging but not restricting U.S. arms sales to Latin America. Such an approach arises as a lesson learned from deteriorated military relations between the U.S. and the Latin American countries, and of course, most especially, Brazil. Antagonism not only stimulates the rise of political nationalism, but foments resentment of U.S. paternalism and indifference. [Ref. 38: p. 53]

Minimizing of third party sales is aimed at limiting a rival's potential influence. Those sales to a third country considered to be detrimental to the United States are those which (1) jeopardize U.S. military advantages and training relations; (2) lessen leverage that could have been gained through logistic and resupply functions; (3) are costly to the recipient and divert greater economic resources than would U.S. sales; (4) may disrupt access and relations with individual countries. [Ref. 38: p. 54]

(2) Regional arms diversification: The advantage of encouraging regional arms diversification is that it enables the use of arms transfer policy to bargain with another supplier and benefit by allowing that supplier to consummate the deal. Another positive factor in supplier diversity is that it can help guard against the too-intense involvement that leads to reverse leverage.

Reverse leverage was avoided during the practice of the Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s. Specifically, at that time there were small scale wars in Latin America, declining U.S. influence and intervention in regional affairs, and increasing diversification of local military relations with European countries. U.S. non-intervention and allowance for diversification was the best policy for keeping leverage in a favorable direction to the U.S. [Ref. 38: pp. 54-55]

b. Cost of Supplier's Attempts to Exert Leverage

In Latin America, the U.S. attempts to exert leverage both by the transfer and denial of arms. The adverse effect of the human rights policy as a punitive exercise of arms denial is a salient example that both can be ineffective. In fact, events proved the mirror image of the philosophy expressed in the following comment taken from the Rand study:

"In some cases the U.S. government may treat an incremental arms transfer as an investment for future influence, but the recipient may treat this same transfer as a payoff or reward for some cooperative action already taken." [Ref. 38: p. 53]

Other costs are the already mentioned dangers of reverse leverage and the promotion of arms races. While no specific examples of the former exist at present, likely recipients who may one day maneuver into a manipulative position are Mexico and Venezuela. The latter question will not be addressed again here.

c. Sociological

The sociological costs are that arms sales can identify the supplier with repressive regimes. The second and third costs, possible loss of prestige and hostages will not be discussed.

Latin American arms transfer authority Caesar Sereseres summarized the major conditions in Latin America which complicate U.S. arms transfer policies. They include "the lessening U.S. presence in the region, the continuing effort by Latin America to diversify relations, and the likelihood of conflict rather than cooperation between Latin American countries, and the repressive and authoritarian practices of several countries in the region." [Ref. 41: p. 48] The last condition, that of repressive and authoritarian practices of several Latin American countries, was studied in depth by Lars Schoultz of the City University of New York. He found that, despite United States efforts to avoid, in effect, strengthening military regimes that violate antitorture human rights, both economic and military aid tended to flow disproportionately to Latin American countries which tortured their citizens. [Ref. 42: p. 167] The specific countries which received 69 percent of the total military aid to Latin America for FY 1975 through FY 1977 were Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. In the former two countries, as the 1970's progressed, military aid continued to amount to more than half of that extended to the rest of Latin America. Correlations were higher in the earlier period because non-repressive governments were receiving almost no military aid, a situation which began to change somewhat after 1977.

Arms transfers figure into these findings as a large percentage of "Total Military Assistance," which is composed of the Military Assistance Plan (MAP), International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants, excess defense stock, transfers, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits. At the time of the study, 89 percent of the U.S. military aid to Latin America was in the form of FMS credits. [Ref. 42: p. 161]

As Dr. Caesar Sereseres wrote in his prepared statement at a House hearing on arms transfers:

"The focus on human rights represented a reaction to the failure of democracy as the antidote to both dictatorship and revolution. As authoritarian regimes undermined the hopes for democracy in the hemisphere, protest against violations of human rights became a central issue--with arms transfers singled out as a tool for leverage and punishment. One Brazilian newspaper labeled the application of the human rights policy as realism for the strong and idealism for the weak." [Ref. 1: p. 42]

This fascinating twist of terms bears commentary in light of what was written on idealism and realism in chapter two. It appears that in Brazilian perception, it is easy for the strong, (the U.S.) to dictate our ideal of the practice of human rights, because for us the ideal is a reality. In the weak countries needful of realization of the rights of man, the application is yet an ideal.

To summarize, U.S. benefits to arms deals with Brazil would certainly outweigh the costs, but only on the condition that the U.S. enter into any agreements as a business partner. That is, it should be careful not to exhibit any remaining attitudes of its former paternalistic stance. This is easier said than done, however, especially in light of the extremes of economic interdependence between the two areas and the natural U.S. anxiety in its espousal of democracy.

VI. THE STATUS OF ARMS TRANSFER IN BRAZIL

This chapter will describe the level of arms in Brazil. After some background, the country will be examined as a recipient, co-producer, and supplier of arms. Although the rationales for their purchase have already been discussed, they will be reiterated. The implications for the U.S. of the development of the arms industry in Brazil will also be reviewed.

A. BACKGROUND

Brazil's current status as the tenth supplier of world arms is not attributable exclusively to the unintended incentive provided by U.S. denials. The more accurate explanation is the steps Brazil had already taken toward self-determination. .

When the Industria de Materia Belico do Brasil (IMBEL) was started in 1965, the United States government had still been the major supplier of arms in Brazil. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in the United States was exercising its transfer of arms at the world's most costly rate, still keeping itself attractive through featuring a wide range of available equipment, technical support, and follow-on programs for spare parts. The Military Assistance Program (MAP) was being cut back due to Congressional and balance of payments pressures. In the 1950's, the MAP had provided arms as grants to countries with collective security agreements with the U.S.

Brazil had already acquired American destroyers and cruisers for its Navy, and full track armored personnel carriers for the Army, among which were the M-113. U.S. aircraft included training/ground attack, reconnaissance, and counterinsurgency planes, C-130 transports, bombers, and fighters.

Today Brazil's purchases are far fewer, mainly because its economy demands that it curtail spending. It remains severed from the U.S. relative to arms transfers done through the government since its unilateral abrogation of military assistance in reaction to Carter's human rights policy. However, it does considerable direct business with private U.S. companies. Other reasons for the breaking away from the U.S. government should be restated: (1) self-sufficiency as a goal had long been a Brazilian aspiration; and (2) neither the anticipated threat nor the financial capabilities of Brazil saw it in the market for sophisticated and expensive equipment, e.g., the F-16, as a country like Venezuela needed and could afford.

B. BRAZIL AS A RECIPIENT

Brazil's biggest arms-related purchases are parts for the weapons it produces domestically. For military aircraft, the Empresa Brasileira Aerea (EMBRAER) imports, on the average, sixty percent of its components. Pratt and Whitney, a U.S. company, provides Brazil with almost all of its airplane engines, since cost and standardization advantages outweigh undesirable dependence on a sole supplier. France is a major supplier of H-90 gun turrets for one of Brazil's armored personnel tanks, in exchange Brazilian electronic components that go into French Mirage aircraft. It also acquires Roland missiles from France. The Italians are suppliers of Oto Melara howitzers to Brazil. Its most

recent contemplated purchase is of Israel's Gabriel missile for Navy corvettes.

C. BRAZILIAN CO-PRODUCTION

Besides the French co-production arrangement for gun turrets, Brazil has a license with Aerospatiale to produce helicopters. Its relations with Italy are extensive, co-producing the Brazilian-assembled MB-326G Xavante with Aeritalia in a project with Brazil for a supersonic aircraft known as the AM-X. [Ref. #3]. An amphibian vehicle developed by the Italian Biselli company features a diesel engine which is uncommon in Brazilian army tanks.

Another licensing arrangement is held with U.S. manufacturer Piper, for light passenger aircraft. ENGESA (Engenheiros Especializados, Sociedade Anonima) or Specialized Engineers, Incorporated, cooperates with the U.S. Bell Aerospace Division of Textron in manufacturing a wheeled amphibious personnel carrier called Hydrocobra for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces.

Licensing and co-production arrangements cannot detract from Brazil's position as having the largest domestic arms industry in Latin America. From IMBEL's beginnings in the late 1960's and early 1970's with the Bandeirante aircraft, a twin-engine turboprop, it now supplies industrialized and developing countries alike with weapons including small arms and quartermaster supplies, military hardware, armored vehicles, patrol boats, support ships, and light transport, passenger, and training aircraft.

D. DOMESTIC ARMS INDUSTRY

The three main domestic arms enterprises in Brazil are the already mentioned EMBRAER and ENGESA, manufacturers of aircraft and armored vehicles, respectively, and AVIBRAS

(Aviacao do Brasil) which is the country's privately-owned missiles and rockets company.

Customers of Brazilian manufactured arms can be divided into major suppliers as recipients, other Latin American countries, other Third World, the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

1. Supplier-Recipients

Major supplier recipients are France and the United Kingdom, both purchasers of EMBRAER's Xingu (EMB-121) trainer. Although not considered a major supplier, Belgium as an industrialized country, should be mentioned as a Xingu recipient.

2. Other Latin America

In Latin America, Colombia has also purchased the EMB-121 trainer. Uruguay, Chile, and Honduras have bought such planes, the latter country recently buying the Tucano model for basic military training. The Bandeirante (EMB-111) aircraft is used by Argentina for maritime patrol and search and rescue (SAR) missions. [Ref. 44].

3. Third World

The rest of the Third World is of considerable interest to Brazilians, especially the oil-producing countries. Besides the usual best-selling Xingu sold widely throughout the Middle East, Libya has purchased \$50 million worth of armored vehicles, and Iraq bought a number of missiles in 1981.

After years of disagreement, the armies of Brazil and Algeria reached a diplomatic rapprochement, consummating resumed relations with a purchase of \$410 million in arms and armored cars in 1982. Prior to the sale, Algerians had been using Soviet equipment. [Ref. 45].

Other Third World buyers include Togo, Gabon, Tunisia, and Qatar, which is now owner of some of the Brazilian wheeled armored vehicles, of which there are three types: ENGESA's EE-9 Cascavel (Portuguese for "rattlesnake"), the six-wheeled Urutu, and the Jararaca.

4. Communist Countries

The Soviet Union, to whom Brazil is second in the production of light, rubber tired armored vehicles, itself purchased a thousand of the same.

Among the reasons for sales of armored vehicles to the PRC are the need for foreign currency and to expand sales in Asia. Brazilians also remarked on the good treatment afforded to their technicians by the Chinese. [Ref. 46].

E. FUTURE BRAZILIAN PRODUCTIONS

New arms in development are a light secret weapon called the "Sucuri," probably a cannon. It is a prototype of ENGESA. ENGEX, developing 105 millimeter cannons, has a subsidiary manufacturing a 90 millimeter version.

Among fifty national industries involved in production of arms, other than the four mentioned above, are CTA (Centro Technico Aeroespacial), responsible for the automatically controlled "Piranha" missile. CTA is also developing a land-sea-air rocket produced by Avibras to be used in country. Other names of import are D.F. Vasconcelos, maker of optical equipment for tanks, etc., and ENVEMO (Engenheiros de Vehiculos de Motores), developers of more military transport vehicles, and Val-Paraiba, which sells rifles overseas.

F. IMPLICATIONS OF BRAZIL'S GROWING ARMS INDUSTRY

The significance of Brazil's arms industry is virtually nil in comparison with those of any of the industrialized countries. Considering the ever-surfacing economic constraints of balance of payments, foreign debt, interest rates, the strong dollar, and increasing protectionism, it would appear that Brazil should be paralyzed in its purchases. In fact, while the FAB (Forca Aerea Brasileira) is exemplary of the other armed forces in seeking development rather than growth in terms of force, purchases are still being made.

Most newsworthy arms deals involve the troubled Middle East. Being almost fully dependent on external source for the oil it consumes in extremely large quantities, Libya and Iraq have enjoyed close relations with Brazil and possess many sophisticated Brazilian weapons, including light tanks and missiles, as well as the Tucano trainer. Now it appears Brazil has chosen Israel's Gabriel missile package to arm the new generation of naval corvettes to be built in the next ten years. The training and maintenance of the missile was more than the U.S., French, and Italian competitors offered. What implications this will have for Brazil's standing with the Arab world remain to be seen. [Ref. 47: p. 338].

Another sensitive situation involves the fact that Brazil consistently offers the U.S. its passenger aircraft at a more attractive price than the U.S. can manufacture a similar aircraft. This leads to much protest in the "buy American" vein. It is doubly ironic when the fact of Brazilian dependence upon U.S. manufactured aircraft engines is considered.

Many lessons are to be learned by Brazil in becoming a self-sufficient nation, especially while it practices its liberal "sell to anyone, buy from anyone" policy. There are three instances wherein it will be interesting to see the reactions of Brazilian policy makers: the aforementioned "invited" friction brought about by the deal with Israel and the subsidy problem involving the United States, and the sizeable sale of armored personnel carriers ongoing with the Soviet Union. It is reasonable to conjecture that Brazil will soon discover weaknesses in the assumption that certain international affairs can be strictly commercial.

VII. CONCLUSION

In the body of the thesis, it was pointed out that due to the abstract and debatable nature of the concept of the national interests, one should be careful about assuming direct effects between interests and actions. Rather it should be taken into account that the way a policy is enacted becomes more meaningful than the philosophy behind it, because often this philosophy is peculiar to the executor, and certainly to the nation enacting it. When countries who are subjected to U.S. policies don't understand our rationales, it is unwise to make assumptions about the "object" (or recipient) country's next moves. More importantly, it should not be assumed that our rationales are so complex, and that lack of comprehension underlies recipient countries' reactions. "Developing" countries are not as politically unsophisticated as we might assume. They are as capable of independent and reasoned foreign policy decisions as are fully emerged powers.

In brief, a study of the effect of U.S. national interest on arms transfers in Latin America, concentrating on Brazil, is a story of Latin Americans wishing to reject the notion that the U.S. should presume to have any effect on arms transfers in their countries. Brazil proves to be having more success in this area, although economic interdependence behooves continued strong ties with the United States. Since exports are the key to improving economy, and arms are the highest income-producing export, Brazil is developing its arms industry to that end.

The correlation between a United States policy and arms transfers in Brazil is only superficial. Resentment to colonialism and paternalism had been simmering long before the moralistic intervention of the U.S. human rights policy brought it to a full boil. Withdrawal of military assistance had been contemplated for years on the part of the Brazilians themselves, not to mention that into the seventies, under Nixon, all Military Assistance Programs were being cut back. Furthermore, the fact that there are no Foreign Military Sales to Brazil excludes that Brazil still relies heavily on U.S. companies for components of its domestically assembled weapons. This merely apparent correlation will be treated as a cause and effect relationship for purposes of these concluding remarks.

The main conclusion is one of a qualified cause and effect relationship between a U.S. national interest in the name of the human rights policy, and the growth of the arms industry in Brazil, assuming that it increased all the more with the lack of dependence on U.S. arms. In other words, the U.S. national interests did indirectly have the effect of motivating Brazil to be the first emerging power in South America to practice rather than preach self-determination. The arms industry is a good measure of such an intention being fulfilled.

To enumerate the effects, they were: (1) Brazil's unilateral withdrawal of military assistance; (2) the buildup of its arms industry with a pronounced tendency to make each successive production more Brazilian; (3) expansion of the market to the Third World, particularly the oil-producing countries; (4) strengthening of co-production arrangements with major suppliers other than the United States, namely Italy and France; (5) enhancement of (or no damage to) direct commercial arms components sales relationships with U.S. private companies.

Conversely, the ill feelings for which human rights takes the blame did not affect some arms related transactions where Brazil plays the part of supplier to the U.S. as recipient: (1) the amphibian Hydrocobra for the Rapid Deployment Forces; and (2) Bandeirante passenger aircraft, commercially used in the U.S., is used militarily as well in Brazil.

Whether the effects are adverse in the U.S. view is a matter of philosophy. Those who believe it is in our national interests to exert more control over Brazil through arms transfers would say the five points above are in fact detrimental. The same could be said for the use of the Brazilian sea-land personnel carrier, and worse for those of the "buy American" persuasion who are appalled by what subsidized imports from Brazil are doing to U.S. economy.

On the other hand, a positive relationship between a growing arms industry, more income from exports, greater domestic well-being and subsequent improved climate for political stability and even democracy can be interpreted as quite beneficial to U.S. interests. Not only would the Brazilian initiated laissez-faire with regard to the United States be non-detrimental as referred to above, it might also eventually prove the "mutual respect" we have heralded, by showing a little more of it on our side. The expansion of the market in South to South exchanges as well as in deals with industrialized countries can help the U.S. interests in two ways: (1) by preventing a too close relationship and contemptual dependence; and (2) by fostering the maturity of Brazil as a global actor and emerging power, subjecting it to the complications of foreign relations that its northern superpower neighbor has been dealing with for years. It may soon be in a position to commiserate with the U.S. on its less effective moves.

Finally, self-determination notwithstanding, the Brazilians acknowledge the need for global interdependence. In dealing with them on a largely commercial basis, the U.S. can maintain ties while still allowing Brazil to attempt to recover from its debt problems in its own way.




Figure (1)




Figure (2)

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
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